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THE COLORADO COUNSEL CONUNDRUM: PLEA




Colorado's procedures for handling misdemeanor prosecutions raise
novel questions of Sixth Amendment law that have not been squarely
addressed by state or federal courts. At the center of Colorado's counsel
conundrum is a statute, Colorado Revised Statute § 16-7-301, which re-
quires the prosecution to negotiate plea deals with a person charged with
a misdemeanor before the defendant has an opportunity to meet with an
attorney. There are strong incentives for defendants to accept a pre-
counsel offer; indeed, by accepting an early, pre-counsel plea, a defend-
ant may accrue sentencing or charge concessions from the prosecution.'
Moreover, and more significant, for defendants who are not released on
bail, the consequences of refusing a pre-counsel plea offer are even more
immediate: such a defendant faces the Hobson's choice of pleading
guilty to a crime without the advice or assistance of counsel and thus
obtaining one's immediate release from custody, or remaining in jail for
several more days until a second appearance when counsel is appointed.2
That is to say, insisting on one's right to counsel in a misdemeanor case
may come at a cost, both in terms of the ultimate sentence, and the length
of the time they are subject to pretrial detention.3 Even a defendant who
is arrested for an offense for which jail is a most unlikely sentence4 could
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law.
t J.D. 2012, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law.
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lence of the Denver University Law Review in striving to publish timely articles at the intersection of
theory and practice.
I. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301 (4)(a)(1) (2011).
2. The Colorado rules provide for the appointment of counsel at the second appearance,
which usually occurs three days after the initial appearance for persons in custody. By contrast,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44 requires that counsel be appointed to defendants "from initial
appearance through appeal, unless the defendant waives this right"; however, an attorney need not be
provided if the federal court determines that the charged offense is a petty offense, defined as a case
"for which the court determines that, in the event of conviction, no sentence of imprisonment will
actually be imposed." Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(a)(3). See also 2 F. LEE BAILEY & KENNETH FISHMAN,
HANDLING MISDEMEANOR CASES § 29:1 (2d ed. 2011) (identifying a circuit split as to whether the
scope of Rule 44 is broader than, or coextensive with the federal constitutional right to counsel).
3. This is consistent with statistics from other jurisdictions demonstrating that the "most
significant predictor of defendants entering a plea of guilty or no contest at arraignment was their
custody status." See, e.g., ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT'L. ASs'N. CRIM. DEF. LAW., THREE-
MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA'S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 15 (2011).
4. If a sentence of actual incarceration is not authorized by the statute, then existing case law
precludes Sixth Amendment claims. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369, 372-74 (1979). This raises
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be held in jail for days while he is awaiting the appointment of counsel
and the next round of plea negotiations if he is not released on bail at the
*- 5initial appearance.
This is not a merely hypothetical problem. There are a variety of
crimes for which a defendant might be detained in pretrial custody even
on a charge for which he will not likely receive a sentence of imprison-
ment. For example, a first DUI offense will likely not result in a sentence
of incarceration, but rather some probationary term and classes. Howev-
er, it is not uncommon for such a defendant to be detained overnight pri-
or to the initial appearance. Accordingly, a DUI defendant, and many
others facing misdemeanors, will be forced to confront the option of ac-
cepting a pre-counsel plea offer from the prosecution, or spending an
extra couple of nights in jail. Many defendants will, quite reasonably, opt
for the prompt, pre-counsel resolution of their case.
In view of this reality, Colorado's pre-counsel plea bargaining sys-
tem presents a trio of difficult Sixth Amendment questions, namely:
(1) At what point does the attachment of the right to counsel occur
in Colorado (under Rothgery v. Gillespie County6);
(2) Does the negotiation and entry of an un-counseled misdemean-
or plea constitute a critical stage for which appointment and presence of
counsel is required (under, for example, United States v. Wade7 ); and
(3) Do sentences of time served or home arrest constitute "actual
incarceration" (under the test announced in Scott v. Illinois8 )?
In short, Colorado's system for prosecuting misdemeanor offenses
presents a constitutional conundrum that has important consequences for
misdemeanor defendants, that is tantalizing for academics, and that is
desperately in need of judicial review. This Article is designed for all
three audiences. The direct constitutional analysis of Colorado's provi-
sions is designed to serve as a guidepost for judges and litigators. Like-
wise, the thorough accounting of the gaps in the academy's collective
knowledge about Sixth Amendment doctrine will hopefully spur addi-
tional empirical, historical, and doctrinal scholarship regarding the right
to counsel in misdemeanor cases.
an important question as to whether, in certain circumstances, the scope and duration of pretrial
detention, standing alone, should suffice to trigger the right to counsel even if the crime does not
authorize a sentence of incarceration. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 203-04 (2008).
5. Jenny M. Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 277, 367 (2011) (observing that the Colorado system has
the effect of encouraging thoughtless waivers of the right to counsel).
6. 554 U.S. 191, 203 (2008).
7. 388 U.S. 218, 236 (1967).
8. 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979) (holding that "actual imprisonment" is "the line defining the
constitutional right to appointment of counsel").
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In analyzing the Sixth Amendment concerns raised by these pre-
counsel misdemeanor plea negotiations, we are mindful of the practical
constraints on the criminal justice system. To be sure, the resources
needed to provide defense counsel at every misdemeanant's initial ap-
pearance would be substantial, and the efficiencies of the current system
are apparent.9 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly empha-
sized that efficiency gains and resource constraints cannot trump the
right to counsel.' 0
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the relevant Sixth
Amendment law. Part I provides a comprehensive account of the prose-
cutorial policies and state-mandated procedures that are relevant to mis-
demeanor prosecutions in Colorado. Finally, Part III analyzes the nature
and viability of constitutional challenges to Colorado's misdemeanor
procedures. Colorado's system for misdemeanor prosecutions presents a
valuable case-study for understanding the federal right to counsel-its
scope, its limits, and the gaps in current doctrine as it applies to misde-
meanor cases.
I. THE THREE-TIERED TRIGGER FOR THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment is the seminal protection for individuals fac-
ing criminal charges. An effective lawyer is often an essential catalyst for
the meaningful realization of other constitutional and statutory rights to
which a defendant is entitled." Moreover, although "the trial may be the
most dramatic and exciting part of the criminal process," it is beyond
debate that deprivations of the right to counsel in the pretrial context will
often affect a greater hardship on the defendant than the absence of coun-
9. Some scholars have argued that the political realities of indigent defense funding make the
persistent clamoring for increased budgets impractical and misguided. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The
Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 464 (2007) (arguing that to
solve "the indigent defense crisis, states should redirect resources now spent on [most misdemean-
ors] to reduce indigent defender caseloads so that those who represent defendants charged with more
serious crimes will have more time to spend on those cases."); id. at 465-66 (pointing to empirical
data suggesting that in low-level misdemeanors "counsel do not appear to provide significant benefit
to the defendants"); id. at 466 ("Indeed, in the federal system, pro se misdemeanor defendants have
better outcomes than every category of represented misdemeanor defendants, including those who
retain attorneys and those represented by appointed counsel."). Likewise, a recent empirical study in
Massachusetts has concluded that in certain contexts, providing counsel to civil litigants does not
provide any statistical advantages. James D. Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, & Jonathan
Hennessy, How Effective Are Limited Legal Assistance Programs? A Randomized Experiment in a
Massachusetts Housing Court, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESOURCE NETWORK (2011),
http://ssm.com/abstract-i 880078.
10. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see also Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972) (Burger, J., concurring) ("Were I able to confine my focus solely to the
burden that the States will have to bear in providing counsel, I would be inclined, at this stage of the
development of the constitutional right to counsel, to conclude that there is much to commend draw-
ing the line at penalties in excess of six months' confinement. Yet several cogent factors suggest the
infirmities in any approach that allows confinement for any period without the aid of counsel . . . .");
see also Hashimoto, supra note 9, at 477 ("Argersinger has had an enormous financial impact on
states and counties-an impact arguably greater than that of Gideon.").
11. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 70 (1932) (recognizing the right to "counsel as perhaps
[a defendant's] most important privilege").
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sel during the trial.12 This is particularly true in view of statistics that
consistently show that more than 90% of all criminal cases are resolved
without a trial,13 and the percentage is likely even higher for misdemean-
ors.14 In recognition of these realities, the Supreme Court has expressly
held that the right to counsel extends beyond the mere right to have a
lawyer present during one's trial.'
The right to counsel in the pretrial setting is not, however, without
limitation. As an initial matter, entirely distinct from the substantive mer-
it of the alleged injury, three distinct threshold limitations must be satis-
fied: first, the right to counsel must have attached; second, the stage dur-
ing which the alleged harm to the defendant occurred must be deemed
"critical"; and third, the defendant must be sentenced to actual incarcera-
tion following his trial or plea. The remainder of this section will focus
on describing the individual and aggregate effects of these limitations on
the right to counsel, both as they apply generally and in Colorado specif-
ically.
A. Attachment
The first limitation on the right to counsel, attachment, is controver-
sial among academics.' 6 The attachment requirement is essentially a doc-
trinal recognition that the right to counsel does not extend indefinitely
back in time before the commencement of the criminal trial; in essence,
the term "attachment" is a shorthand for the earliest point in a case when
a defendant enjoys Sixth Amendment protections.17 This temporal limita-
tion is understood as a measure designed to give effect to the Sixth
Amendment's text, which provides that only during "criminal prosecu-
12. Justin Marceau, Pretrial Ineffective Assistance, U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2012).
13. E.g., Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 381, 382 (2009) ("[T]he vast majority of today's criminal cases-90% or more-
are resolved by negotiated disposition rather than trial."); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh
Effects of Bad Plea Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/3 1/us/supreme-court-to-hear-cases-involving-bad-advice-on-plea-
deals.html?_r-1 ("Last year [2010], 97 percent of convictions in federal courts were the result of
guilty pleas. In 2006, the last year for which data was available, the corresponding percentage in
state courts was 94."); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 Yale L.J. 857, 1012-
13 (2000) ("[l]n modem American courtrooms ... guilty-plea rates above ninety or even ninety-five
percent are common.").
14. See, e.g., SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 3, at 9 (reporting that in a Florida study, the
authors found that "94% of misdemeanor cases are resolved before trial").
15. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
688 n.6 (1972) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 224-25 (1967); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993). As one
Sixth Amendment scholar has observed, "a 'fair trial' implicates much more than the trial itself ...
[because] [d]efendans ... rarely face their accusers during traditional courtroom proceedings . . .
Holland, supra note 13, at 381-82.
16. There is a long and impressive line of scholarship assailing the attachment requirement as
overly formalistic and inconsistent with the spirit of the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., id. at 381;
Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right to Counsel Doctrine, 97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2003).
17. See, e.g., Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688-90.
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tions" shall a defendant enjoy the right to counsel.18 In other words, even
though the right to counsel extends beyond representation at trial, the
defendant must be facing something akin to a criminal prosecution be-
fore the right to counsel applies. But as a practical matter, a rigid insist-
ence on the commencement of a criminal prosecution has the formalistic
effect of depriving defendants of the right to counsel in many of the most
important stages of their defense. For example, police interrogations and
identifications routinely occur before the formal attachment of the right
to counsel;' 9 although the entire fate of one's case may turn on the advice
and aid of counsel during an interrogation or identification, the Sixth
Amendment's protections do not extend to these proceedings. 20 As rele-
vant for the Colorado procedures discussed herein, the scope of the right
is, therefore, often associated with formalism much more than with a
functionalist inquiry of whether counsel would be valuable at a particular
stage of the criminal process.21 As Professor Metzger has explained, the
Court's rigid insistence on the attachment requirement marks a "triumph
of the letter over the spirit of the law."22
The right to counsel, then, has not been interpreted as providing a
continuum of protections in the pretrial context. If the right to counsel
has not attached, then the right to counsel provides no protections, not
merely lesser protections.23 Notably, the Court's elaboration on the point
of attachment has been largely relegated to cryptic dicta, but a few nota-
ble data points stand out. For example, in Kirby v. Illinois,24 the Court
defined attachment as the point of "formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment information, or arraignment." 2 5 Likewise, cases arising in the
interrogation context identified the "arraignment" 26 or even just an ar-
raignment on the complaint or "outstanding arrest warrant" 27 as the point
of attachment.
For many states and the federal government, the point at which the
right to counsel attaches for constitutional purposes is of merely academ-
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. Although the protections of Miranda v. Arizona apply to all custodial interrogations, 384
U.S. 436, 500 (1966), the Miranda right to counsel is, as a practical matter, nothing more than a right
to remain silent until the court appoints a lawyer. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-87
(1981) (recognizing that the invocation of the right to counsel by a suspect requires only that police
cease questioning until the defendant has met with his attorney).
20. Holland, supra note 13, at 384-85. But cf Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932)
(noting that the right to counsel may not be so circumscribed as to preclude counsel from giving
meaningful "aid in the preparation and trial of the case").
21. Contra Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (describing the attachment requirement as giving effect to
the language of the Sixth Amendment, rather than as a "mere formalism").
22. Metzger, supra note 16, at 1671 (citing United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 615 (6th
Cir. 2000)). "There are other pre-indictment procedures one might use to demonstrate how the
bright-line [attachment] rule fails to honor the Sixth Amendment's promise." Id at 1668 n.200.
23. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90.
24. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
25. Id. at 689.
26. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964).
27. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 391, 399-401 (1977).
2012] 331
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ic interest. Most jurisdictions, including all federal districts, require the
appointment of counsel at the first appearance of a defendant who has a
- 28right to counsel.
Colorado, however, is a notable exception. Colorado law does not
provide for the appointment of counsel at the defendant's first appear-
ance even in cases where the defendant has a right to counsel. 29 Specifi-
cally, the rules in Colorado provide that for misdemeanor defendants the
right to counsel is delayed until after the defendant speaks with the pros-
ecutor about potential plea options.30 In Colorado, then, the appointment
of counsel may be delayed for days after the initial appearance.
The state of Texas also is among the minority of states that do not
appoint counsel until after the initial appearance. The United States Su-
preme Court recently considered the Sixth Amendment implications of
Texas's procedures for the appointment of counsel in Rothgery v. Gilles-
pie County.31 The procedural posture of the case was such that the consti-
tutionality of denying counsel at an initial appearance was not before the
Court; instead, it was a pure question of attachment: whether a defend-
ant's first appearance is sufficient to trigger the attachment of counsel if
the public prosecutor is not aware of or involved in that first appear-
ance?32 Specifically, the question before the Court was whether the Fifth
Circuit was correct in affirming a summary judgment order in a § 1983
case on the grounds "that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not
attach" at an initial appearance because prosecutors were not aware of or
involved in that appearance. Answering the question unequivocally, the
Court held that "the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
applies at the first appearance before a judicial officer at which a defend-
ant is told of the formal accusation against him and restrictions are im-
posed on his liberty," even if the public prosecutor is not aware of or
present at the initial proceeding. 34 Thus, although Texas did not require
the appointment of counsel for the first appearance or even the notifica-
tion of the prosecution, an initial appearance was recognized as marking
the point of attachment for the right to counsel.
28. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 203-04 (2008) ("We are advised without
contradiction that not only the Federal Government, including the District of Columbia, but 43 States
take the first step toward appointing counsel before, at, or just after initial appearance." (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Of course, the mere appointment of counsel does not resolve questions as
to the scope of ineffective assistance of counsel protections prior to trial. See, e.g., Marceau, supra
note 12 (discussing, in Section 1(c), that the right to counsel does not apply to convictions that do not
result in incarceration); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972).
29. COLo. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301(1) (2011).
30. § 16-7-301(4)(a), discussedin infra Part II.
31. 554 U.S. at 191.
32. Id. at 194-95.
33. Id. at 197-98.
34. Id. at 194-95.
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The unmistakable implication of Rothgery for Colorado is that the
initial appearance of the defendant, where the defendant is informed of
the "formal accusation"35 against him, triggers the attachment of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Under Colorado Criminal Proce-
dure Rule 5, a defendant must be advised of his rights and the charges
against him at the initial appearance; 37 the proceeding is, therefore, func-
tionally identical to the proceeding at issue in Rothgery.
Notably, however, the Colorado courts are presently stuck in a rut
of outdated Sixth Amendment precedent.38 Treatises and lower courts
continue to cite a Colorado Supreme Court decision from 1992, People v.
Anderson, for the proposition that an initial appearance under Colorado
Rule 5 is insufficient to trigger the attachment of the right to counsel.3 9
This conclusion cannot survive the Rothgery decision. During the initial
appearance in Colorado, commonly referred to as a Rule 5 proceeding, or
more formally "the Crim. P. 5 proceeding," the defendant must be ad-
vised of the nature of the charges against him, his rights-including the
right to counsel, to a jury, and the right against self-incrimination-and
the terms of his bail, if he is bailable, are set. 40 Because Rothgery recog-
nized that there was "'no doubt' that the right to counsel attached at the
initial appearance,"4A and because the inquiry is functional rather than
technical-that is to say, the right to counsel attaches once there is "an
35. Because there are not formal charges for purposes of a felony case until after an indict-
ment or initial appearance, the Supreme Court used the term "formal accusation" to designate the
point when the right to counsel attaches. See id. at 194.
36. Colorado's current case law appears to be inconsistent with the federal standard on this
point, articulated in Rothgery. People v. Anderson, 842 P.2d 621, 623-24 (Colo. 1992) (holding that
an initial appearance does not trigger attachment).
37. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 5(c)(2) ('At the first appearance in the county court the defendant shall
be advised in accordance with the provisions set forth [regarding felonies] ... , except that [in mis-
demeanor cases] the defendant shall be advised that an application for the appointment of counsel
shall not be made until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the defendant as provided in
C.R.S. 16-7-301(4)(a)."). Under Rule 5, then, there is at least the possibility that prosecutors might
meet with defendants to offer plea deals after the initial appearance. It seems, however, that the
common practice is to meet with the misdemeanor defendants regarding plea offers prior to the
initial appearance.
38. For example, the leading Colorado treatise has posited that "[tihe Colorado Supreme
Court has adopted the same test for determining when the right to counsel attaches under the Colora-
do Constitution." 14 COLO. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 13.52 (2d ed. 2011) (citing
Anderson, 842 P.2d at 623).
39. Anderson, 842 P.2d at 623. It is worth noting that apparently at the time of Anderson's
initial appearance the prosecution had not yet filed a complaint (and no complaint had been filed).
Id. Under the reasoning of Anderson it was significant that the prosecution had not yet "elected to
prosecute the defendant [and] [for this reason, the [Rule] 5 proceeding did not constitute an initia-
tion of an adversary judicial proceeding against the defendant." Id. But the Rothgery holding is clear
that the "attachment rule [is] unqualified by prosecutorial involvement." 554 U.S. at 209-10 ("[A]n
initial appearance following a charge signifies a sufficient commitment to prosecute regardless of a
prosecutor's participation, indictment, information, or what the County calls a 'formal' complaint.").
40. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(2).
41. Id. at 211 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977)).
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initial appearance before a magistrate'A2-there is no question that the
Rule 5 proceeding signals the attachment of the right to counsel.
The failure of Colorado courts to expressly recognize that the Sixth
Amendment attachment occurs at the Crim. P. 5 proceeding is probably
more a product of the recency of the Rothgery decision than a reflection
of inattention or disregard on the part of the Colorado courts. 4 3 In short
order, a case turning on an attachment issue will present itself to the Col-
orado Supreme Court, and to be sure, the Colorado Supreme Court will
be bound by the holding of Rothgery that "a criminal defendant's initial
appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against
him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary
judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel."4
B. Critical Stage
The attachment of the right to counsel is a necessary, but not a suf-
ficient, condition for the full protections of the Sixth Amendment. In
Montejo v. Louisiana, for example, the Supreme Court held that a de-
fendant does not enjoy an unlimited right to have counsel's guiding hand
at all points post-attachment; instead, the defendant's "right to have
counsel present" extends only to "critical" stages of the criminal pro-
ceedings. 45 Viewed in this light, the determination that one's right to
counsel has attached is, standing alone, a rather hollow constitutional
victory for a defendant. Although a violation of the right to counsel can
never arise before attachment, neither does the deprivation of counsel
post-attachment constitute a constitutional injury unless the proceeding
42. Id. at 199 (noting that the name of the proceeding is irrelevant; if there is a "hearing at
which 'the magistrate informs the defendant of the charge in the complaint, and of various rights in
further proceedings', and 'determine[s] the conditions for pretrial release,"' then the right to counsel
attaches (alteration in original) (quoting WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.4(g) (3d
ed. 2007))). Again, it is notable that in Colorado, apparently some proceedings appear to commence,
via initial appearance under Rule 5, without a complaint being filed. See Anderson, 842 P.2d at 623.
However, the absence of a formal complaint, no more than the absence of prosecutor involvement, is
not dispositive-the Rothgery approach is clearly one of function over form: "[A] criminal defend-
ant's initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his
liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attach-
ment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213. The initial appearance in
Colorado clearly satisfies each of these criteria. Contra Anderson, 842 P.2d at 622-23.
43. The Supreme Court of Colorado has not yet had occasion to analyze the Rothgery deci-
sion, but the one Colorado case citing to Rothgery notes that the decision "refin[es] the test for
attachment of the 6th Amendment right to counsel." People v. Wright, 196 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Colo.
2008).
44. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213.
45. 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009) ("[O]nce the adversary judicial process has been initiated,
the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all "critical" stages
of the criminal proceedings."); see also Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 212 ("Once attachment occurs, the
accused at least is entitled to the presence of appointed counsel during any 'critical stage' of the
postattachment proceedings . . . .").
334 [Vol. 89:2
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in question was a critical stage. As the Court has explained, "the enquiry
into that right is a different one from the attachment analysis."46
That is to say, the right to the appointment and presence of counsel
is not necessarily coextensive with the attachment of the right to counsel.
As a result, the range of constitutional benefits that inhere from the at-
tachment alone is relatively meager. The principal advantage to defend-
ants resulting from attachment is the right to have counsel present for a
variety of non-trial proceedings that have been recognized as critical
stages. Most notably, formal police efforts designed to elicit incriminat-
ing statements from the defendant in the absence of an attorney run afoul
of the right to counsel once the right has attached, even if the defendant
is not in custody.47 Likewise, whereas pre-attachment corporeal identifi-
cations do not implicate the right to counsel, once the right has attached,
a defendant has the right to the presence of counsel at all in-person iden-
tification procedures.48
More generally, however, due to the distinction between the at-
tachment of the right to counsel and the right to the presence and assis-
tance of counsel, an understanding of what constitutes a critical stage is
essential for all varieties of Sixth Amendment concerns, including the
Colorado procedures for misdemeanor plea bargains at issue in this Arti-
cle. Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court's guidance on what
constitutes a critical stage has been mind-boggling in its opacity.49 For
46. Id.
47. Prior to the attachment of the right to counsel, only the Fifth Amendment protects a de-
fendant from coercive police interrogation techniques. Notably, the Miranda warnings, unlike the
Sixth Amendment protections, are only triggered by custodial interrogation. See Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298, 300-02 (1980). Moreover, so long as Miranda warnings are provided to
the defendant, only the most conscience shocking behavior implicates Fifth Amendment concerns.
See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-24 (1959). Indeed, most confessions obtained after
the provision of Miranda warnings will be deemed voluntary. See Kenji Yoshino, Miranda's Fall,
98 MICH. L. REv. 1399, 1412 (2000) (reviewing ALBERT CAMus, THE FALL (Justin O'Brien, trans.,
Vintage Books 1991) ("[T]he officer ... can be protected by the warning from many forms of sub-
sequent scrutiny .... ). By contrast, once the right to counsel has attached, any efforts by law en-
forcement to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from the defendant give rise to Sixth
Amendment claims, even if the defendant is not in custody. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 205-07 (1964) (defendant was not in custody); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401
(1977).
48. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-25 (1967) (lineup is a critical stage). But see
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 690 (1972) (declining to hold that all pre-trial identifications
conducted without a defense attorney are per se during a critical stage because some identifications
and lineups "[take] place long before the commencement of any prosecution whatsoever").
49. See D. Christopher Dearborn, "You Have the Right to an Attorney," But Not Right Now:
Combating Miranda's Failure by Advancing the Point of Attachment Under Article XII of the Mas-
sachusetts Declaration ofRights, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 359, 388-89 (2011) (noting that the United
States Supreme Court relies on language that is "susceptible to expansive interpretation" and "the
Court's proffered bright-line rule has become increasingly arbitrary because most suspects face
numerous trial-like confrontations long before the right to counsel attaches" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Hannah Misner, Comment, Maryland v. Shatzer: Stamping a Fourteen-Day Expira-
tion on Miranda Rights, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 289, 309 (2010) (noting that there is an "increasingly
blurred line between the critical and non-critical stage[s] of criminal prosecutions"); Amanda Myra
Homung, The Paper Tiger of Gideon v. Wainwright and the Evisceration of the Right to Appoint-
ment of Counsel for Indigent Defendants, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 495, 522 (2005)
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example, in United States v. Wade,o the seminal case defining "critical
stage," the Court merely identified as critical those proceedings in which
the "presence of counsel .. . operates to assure that the accused's interests
will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal pros-
ecution."5'
In light of such ambiguity of definition, it is generally more helpful
to consider examples of proceedings that have been deemed "critical"
and contrast them with those that have been viewed as "non-critical." For
example, it is clear that all stages of a trial are critical stages;52 likewise,
arraignments,5 3 preliminary hearings, 54 post-charge corporeal identifica-
tions,55 police interrogations "occurring after the first formal charging
proceeding," 56 and sentencing proceedingS57 are all critical stages. By
contrast, it seems that non-corporeal identifications, 58 pre-sentence inter-
views 59 pre-initial appearance police investigations,60 and an array of
other proceedings, such as consolidation hearings and DNA hearings62
are not critical stages. There is no clear pattern or means of predicting
whether something will be deemed a critical stage beyond a case-by-case
inquiry into how important a particular proceeding is to the ultimate out-
come in a case. The best a lower court can do is to recognize as a critical
stage "any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out,
where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial."63
Despite the overall ambiguity as to what constitutes a critical stage,
the Court's analysis of plea bargaining has been surprisingly clear. The
("Because the Court has interpreted the attachment of the right to counsel at different stages under
the criminal procedure rules of different states, there is room for debate about what constitutes a
critical stage.").
50. 388 U.S. at 227-28.
51. Id. at 227.
52. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,64 (1932).
53. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 52-55 (1961) (applying Alabama law).
54. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (applying Maryland law).
55. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37.
56. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986). But see Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 171
n.2 (explaining that the right to counsel is offense specific and "there is no 'background principle' of
our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence establishing that there may be no contact between a defendant
and police without counsel present").
57. See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
58. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) ("[Tihe Sixth Amendment does not grant
the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the Government for the purpose of allow-
ing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender.").
59. See, e.g., United States v. Hodges, 259 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Archambault, 344 F.3d 732, 736 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Washington, 11 F.3d 1510,
1517 (10th Cir. 1993).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 96 (3d Cir. 2002).
61. Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 315 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying Michigan law).
62. McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (8th Cir. 2010).
63. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). Or as one federal circuit court recently
articulated the inquiry, "Whether it was a critical stage depends on whether there was a reasonable
probability that [the defendant's] case could suffer significant consequences." Van v. Jones, 475
F.3d 292, 313 (6th Cir. 2007).
THE COLORADO COUNSEL CONUNDRUM
Court's post-Gideon right to counsel jurisprudence has consistently rec-
ognized the process of plea bargaining as a critical stage. As one com-
mentator recently concluded, "[p]lea bargaining is [a] critical stage, not
only because it is 'an essential component of the administration of jus-
tice,' but also because ninety-five percent of convictions end in plea bar-
gains."65 The view that plea bargaining is a critical stage is hardly a nov-
el conclusion, and instead rests on over thirty years of right to counsel
jurisprudence. In 1984, the Court announced in Strickland v. Washing-
ton6 6 the modem standard for evaluating whether counsel provided con-
stitutionally adequate or effective representation.67 Just one year later, the
Court applied this newly minted standard to the plea process in Hill v.
Lockhart.68
In Hill, the defendant alleged that his decision to plead guilty was
tainted by the ineffective assistance of his attorney in failing to adequate-
ly advise him as to his eligibility for parole.69 While the Court ultimately
rejected his claim on the merits, it recognized that a defendant would
satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland's ineffective assistance of coun-
sel test if he could establish that but for the errors or omissions by coun-
sel, there was a "reasonable probability that ... he would not have plead-
ed guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 70 The Hill decision,
therefore, explicitly identifies the process of pleading guilty as a critical
stage of the criminal case for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Moreo-
ver, the Court's decisions from this Term, Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v.
Cooper, explicitly extend the right to counsel protections to plea bargain-
ing even when the fair trial right is not implicated - that is even where
the defendant pleads not guilty.71 Accordingly, the plea process-
64. See e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (noting that the Court has
"long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel"). Even prior to Gideon, the Court
recognized the central role of plea bargaining to a fair justice system. See Williams v. Kaiser, 323
U.S. 471, 475 (1945).
65. David A. Perez, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During
Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532, 1539 (2011) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
260 (1971)).
66. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
67. Id. at 694 ("The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.").
68. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
69. Id. at 53-55.
70. Id. at 59. In some jurisdictions, the prejudice inquiry requires not only a showing that it is
reasonably likely that the defendant would have accepted the plea, but also that the trial judge would
have accepted the terms of the agreement. But see 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 21.3 (b) (3d ed. 2011) ("Under the majority view, this standard does not require a
defendant to prove that the trial judge would have accepted the plea agreement." (internal citations
omitted)).
71. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (noting that "[iun today's criminal justice
system . .. the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the
critical point for a defendant"). See also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (noting that
the "criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.").
3372012]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
whether it is a guilty or a not guilty plea-triggers a series of duties for
competent counsel, including, among others, to investigate the facts and
law surrounding the charges, to advise the client as to the risks associated
with a trial as compared to a plea, and to advise the client as to the con-
sequences of pleading guilty.7 2 The Court recently interpreted this latter
duty of competent counsel to hold that competent representation requires
the defense attorney to advise his client not only of the direct conse-
quences of a guilty plea, but also of at least some collateral consequenc-
OS73es. 7
To be clear, then, it is settled as a matter of Sixth Amendment law
that the process of evaluating a plea offer is a critical stage of the crimi-
nal proceeding for which the appointment and presence of counsel are
constitutionally required.74 Colorado law is equally clear on this point,
recognizing that the "entire plea bargaining process" is a critical stage to
which the full protections of the Sixth Amendment apply.75
C. Actual Incarceration
The third cognizability hurdle in the right to counsel realm is the ac-
tual incarceration rule. Although all felony prosecutions require the ap-
pointment of counsel,76 misdemeanor prosecutions only implicate the
right to counsel when the defendant is sentenced to actual incarceration.77
As a result, for misdemeanor prosecutions, even if the right to counsel
would have attached, and even if the proceeding in question is otherwise
a critical stage of the criminal process, if the defendant is not eventually
sentenced to incarceration, the right to counsel cannot be violated. Nei-
ther the incompetence of counsel, nor even the complete failure to ap-
72. 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 70, § 21.3(b) (cataloguing the duties and responsibilities of
counsel during the plea process).
73. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (requiring advisements regarding the
clear immigration consequences of one's guilty plea).
74. The United States Supreme Court recently announced that a defense attorney's errors
during plea negotiations leading to not guilty plea could constitute a Sixth Amendment violation of
the right to effective assistance of counsel, despite the fact that the defendant received a fair trial.
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) ("[Diefense counsel has the duty to communicate
formal offers from the prosecution . . . [and by] allow[ing] the offer to expire without advising the
defendant or allowing him to consider it, defense counsel did not render the effective assistance the
Constitution requires."); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012) ("If a plea bargain has been
offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept
it. If that right is denied, prejudice can be shown if loss of the plea opportunity led to a trial resulting
in a conviction on more serious charges or the imposition of a more severe sentence.").
75. See, e.g., Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d 800, 805 (Colo. 2009).
76. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963). The Gideon case did not explic-
itly resolve the issue, but it is generally read as requiring the appointment of counsel for all felony
prosecutions. See, e.g., Lily Fu, High Crimes from Misdemeanors: The Collateral Use of Prior,
Uncounseled Misdemeanors Under the Sixth Amendment, Baldasar and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 77 MINN. L. REv. 165, 170 (1992) ("[Clourts widely interpreted the right to counsel
announced in Gideon to extend only to accused felons and not to accused misdemeanants.").
77. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
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point an attorney, constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation if the defend-
ant is not actually incarcerated.78
The Sixth Amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." 79 Despite this absolutist language, several states concluded that
the right to appointed counsel did not apply to petty offenses.o The Su-
preme Court clarified the scope of the Sixth Amendment in this arena in
Argersinger v. Hamlin8' by squarely rejecting the "premise that since
prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six
months may be tried without a jury, they may also be tried without a
lawyer." 82 The Court noted that it was "by no means convinced that legal
and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to im-
prisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a
person can be sent off for six months or more"83 and thus held that "ab-
sent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for
any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless
he was represented by counsel at his trial."84 Moreover, the Argersinger
decision does not limit its discussion of the importance of counsel in
misdemeanor cases to trial. The Court explained:
Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of the guilty plea,
a problem which looms large in misdemeanor as well as in felony
cases. Counsel is needed so that the accused may know precisely
what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to
jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.
In addition, the volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in num-
ber than felony prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dis-
positions, regardless of the fairness of the result.85
Thus, for both plea bargaining and trials, Argersinger made clear
that unless a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to
78. The mere possibility under the statute for a sentence of incarceration does not implicate
the Sixth Amendment. However, there is a split of authority as to whether a federal judge's failure to
make a finding during the initial appearance that incarceration is not permitted violates the federal
rules. Laurie L. Levenson, FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULES HANDBOOK FCRP 44 (2011). ("Under the
federal rules, the right to counsel extends to all offenses, petty and serious alike. However, if the
federal magistrate judge commits on the record prior to trial that any sentence will not include im-
prisonment, defendant need not be assigned counsel pursuant to Rule 44.").
79. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
80. See discussion infra Part 1.
81. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
82. Id at 30-31.
83. Id. at 33.
84. Id. at 37. As a leading treatise has observed, "The reference in this sentence and others to
a felony resulting in imprisonment might be taken to suggest that a felony which would not result in
imprisonment also would not require appointed counsel. However, . . . numerous subsequent opin-
ions . . . [establish] an absolute right to appointed counsel in all felony cases, making no reference to
the punishment imposed." LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 70, at § 11.2(a).
85. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34.
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counsel, he could not be imprisoned unless he was appointed counsel.
The question left unresolved by Argensinger, however, was whether the
right to counsel existed in cases where there was no "loss of liberty"
86through incarceration.
In Scott v. Illinois, the Court resolved this issue by holding that
counsel is not required in all misdemeanor cases in which "imprisonment
is an authorized penalty."87 Instead, the Court held that the right to coun-
sel requires "only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assis-
tance of appointed counsel in his defense. In other words, non-
appointment of counsel does not violate the Sixth Amendment in misde-
meanor cases where a sentence of imprisonment is authorized, but not
imposed. In this way, the Court avoided what it regarded as an extension
of the Sixth Amendment that would threaten to "create confusion and
impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite di-
verse States."
In short, the scope of the right to counsel is limited by three distinct
requirements. First, the right to counsel is never implicated before the
attachment of the right. Second, even when the right to counsel has at-
tached, the right only requires the assistance of counsel at those stages
that are critical to the fairness and reliability of the criminal proceeding.
And third, even where the right would otherwise have attached and the
proceeding implicates the fundamental fairness of the criminal process,
the right to counsel does not apply if the defendant is not sentenced to
actual incarceration.
86. Id. at 37 ("We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the
right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, however, for here petitioner was in fact sen-
tenced to jail.").
87. 440 U.S. 367, 368-69 (1979).
88. Id. at 373-74. The Court also stated, "the central premise of Argersinger - that actual
imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment - is emi-
nently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional
right to appointment of counsel." Id. at 373. It warrants reiterating the obvious-State constitutions
and rules of criminal procedure may provide more robust protections. A state constitution might be
interpreted so as to recognize that Scott has no application as a matter of state law, and likewise
Federal Rule 44, regarding the appointment of counsel, might be construed to require a trial court's
finding that incarceration will not be imposed at the initial appearance if the defendant is to be
forced to proceed without counsel. To date, however, commentators have concluded that the Colora-
do courts have regarded both the state and federal right to counsel as co-extensive. See, e.g., ROBERT
J. DIETER, 13 COLO. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 13.5 n. I (2d Ed. 2011) (noting
that Colo. Const. art. II, § 16 is the state protection for the right to counsel and recognizing that
"Colorado has not chosen to interpret this right more expansively than the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tee").
89. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373. Another case relevant to whether the right to counsel applies is
Nichols v. United States, which holds that "an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under
Scott because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a
subsequent conviction." 511 U.S. 738, 749 (1994); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662-
65 (2002) (distinguishing Nichols in the context of a suspended sentence).
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Having described these three limitations on the right to counsel, the
next section of this Article explains the Colorado-specific procedures for
prosecuting misdemeanors, 90 before analyzing Colorado's system in light
of these three limitations.91.
II. THE COLORADO PROCEDURES FOR PROSECUTING MISDEMEANOR
CASES
A. Statutory Requirements
The Colorado legislature has adopted a simplified set of procedures
for commencing prosecution in misdemeanor and petty offense cases. 9 2
In contrast to the more robust processes required for felony prosecutions
(including the requirement of a preliminary hearing and information or a
grand jury indictment), 93 the misdemeanor procedures permit a prosecu-
tion to be conducted on the basis of a complaint alone. 94 Moreover, Colo-
rado has specific rules governing plea bargains. Most notably, Colorado
Revised Statute § 16-7-301 sets forth the specific duties and responsibili-
ties of district attorneys during plea agreements and discussions. 95 The
statute specifically limits the circumstances in which a prosecutor may
discuss a plea bargain with a defendant without the presence of counsel:
He should engage in plea discussions or reach plea agreements with
the defendant only through or in the presence of defense counsel ex-
cept where the defendant is not eligible for appointment of counsel,
or refuses appointment of counsel and has not retained counsel, or [if
it is a misdemeanor, petty, or traffic offense]. 96
For all felony cases, then, the prosecutor is affirmatively prohibited
from speaking with a defendant unless the defendant's attorney is pre-
sent, or the defendant specifically waives his right to counsel. By con-
trast, for misdemeanor prosecutions the rule is exactly the opposite-that
is, prosecutors are not just permitted, but specifically required to engage
in plea discussions with the defendant before the appointment of counsel.
Colorado Revised Statute § 16-7-301(4)(a) provides that:
In misdemeanors, petty offenses, or offenses under title 42, C.R.S.
[traffic offenses], the prosecuting attorney is obligated to tell the de-
90. See infra Part 1l.
91. See infra Part Ill.
92. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2-101 (2011); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 4.1; see also, Robert J. Dieter,
Commencement of Criminal Proceedings-Introduction, 14 COLO. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2.1 (2d ed. 2011).
93. See § 16-5-101 (2011); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 7; see also COLO. R. CRIM. P. 3.
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fendant any offer that can be made based on the facts as known by
the prosecuting attorney at that time.97
These statutorily mandated plea discussions must occur before the
appointment of counsel. The statute specifies "[t]he application for ap-
pointment of counsel and the payment of the application fee shall be de-
ferred until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the defendant"
about potential plea offers.9 8
Defenders of the statute, however, would likely be quick to point
out the codified protections that apply to misdemeanor defendants. Most
notably, during these pre-counsel plea negotiations prosecutors are re-
quired to "advise the defendant that the defendant has the right to retain
counsel or seek appointment of counsel," and that the defendant "is un-
der no obligation to talk to the prosecuting attomey." 99 These warnings
tend to understate the practical harm that results from exercising one's
right to counsel. Specifically, for a person detained in jail, conditioning
his immediate release on a guilty plea will oftentimes be too tantalizing
to pass up. Warnings or not, if he asserts his right to counsel, the prose-
cutor will inform him that he may have to remain incarcerated until his
second appearance. To be sure, foregoing counsel in order to forego an-
other night in jail will be a reflexive decision for many defendants. 00
If an agreement as to the proper disposition of the case is reached
between the prosecutor and the unrepresented defendant, the prosecutor
must "inform the court of the proposed plea agreement and the recom-
mended penalty."' 0 ' As with other plea offers, the court ultimately has
discretion to either accept or reject the agreed-upon disposition.102 Spe-
cifically, the court must "exercise an independent judgment in deciding
whether to grant charge or sentence concessions." 0 3 If the court rejects
the plea agreement, it must give the defendant the option to withdraw the
guilty plea.'1 Moreover, if a defendant does not accept the pre-counsel




100. See Nancy Amoury Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited
Influence of Sentence Concessions, 59 VAND. L. REv. 69, 147 (2006) ("[D]omestic defendants in
the main agree to self-convict because they expect to receive shorter sentences. Indeed, the fact that
sentence discounts motivate domestic defendants to plead guilty virtually goes without saying in the
plea-bargaining literature. It is simply understood that defendants prosecuted in Western criminal
justice systems seek to minimize their incarceration time.").
101. § 16-7-301(4)(a)(1).
102. See COLO. R. CIuM. P. 11(0(5).
103. Young v. People, 30 P.3d 202, 206 (Colo. 2001) (quoting COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11(f)(5)).
104. Id.; see also COLO. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) ("If the court decides that the final disposition
should not include the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by a plea agreement . . . the
court shall so advise the defendant and the district attorney and then call upon the defendant to either
affirm or withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere."); People v. Wright, 559 P.2d 249, 251
(Colo. App. 1976).
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an absolute right to a court-appointed attorney unless the prosecutor pro-
vides a "written statement that incarceration is not being sought." 05 In
other words, in any misdemeanor case where a plea agreement is offered
before the initial appearance, but rejected by the defendant, the remain-
ing interactions between the parties resemble the interactions between
the defense and the prosecution in a felony case. In particular, when the
statutorily required un-counseled plea negotiation does not yield an
agreement, an indigent defendant is provided court-appointed counsel,' 0 6
and once counsel is retained or appointed, the prosecutor may only en-
gage in further plea discussions when defense counsel is present.107
On the other hand, if the court determines that the proposed plea
agreement is acceptable, a variety of Colorado statutes and rules require
the judge to advise the defendant, once again, of his right to a court-
appointed attorney before accepting the guilty plea. 08 For example, Rule
11 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the trial judge
to create a record demonstrating, among other things, that the defendant
understands the charges against him, that the plea is voluntary and know-
ing, and that he has the right to a jury and to counsel if he does not plead
guilty. 09 Only after these advisements and findings have been satisfied
may the court accept a guilty plea."l0
105. § 18-1-403 ("Except as provided in section 16-5-501, C.R.S., all indigent persons who are
charged with or held for the commission of a crime are entitled to legal representation and support-
ing services at state expense . . . ."); Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255 (Colo. 2011)
(stating that a misdemeanor defendant has the "right to be represented by counsel, and if he is indi-
gent and faces incarceration, he has a right to court-appointed counsel"); People v. Garcia, 981 P.2d
214, 218 (Colo. App. 1998) ("[A]n indigent defendant is entitled to legal representation and support-
ing services at state expense."). If the defendant is convicted, but not actually sentenced to any
incarceration, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation. However, some federal courts have
recognized that the failure to make a pretrial determination as to whether incarceration is a possible
penalty requires the appointment of counsel-that is, if the penalty is not explicitly taken off the
table, then an attorney must be provided even if no incarceration ultimately results. See, e.g., United
States v. Downin, 884 F. Supp. 1474, 1479 (E.D. Cal. 1995); 2 BAILEY & FISHMAN,supra note 2, §
29:1 (noting the split of federal authority on this issue).
106. § 16-7-301(4)(a)(ll). It is also worth noting that under Colorado Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 5(c)(2), the court must advise the defendant that "an application for the appointment of counsel
shall not be made until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the defendant as provided in
C.R.S. 16-7-301(4)(a)." Thus, if the prosecution has not engaged in plea discussions prior to the
initial appearance, or informed the defendant that there is no pre-arraignment offer, the defendant
will be advised by the Court that the appointment of counsel must be deferred until after such meet-
ings occur.
107. See § 16-7-301(4)(a)(ll) ("If a plea agreement has not been reached and the defendant
chooses to retain an attorney, or the defendant meets the requirements [for appointment of counsel],
the court shall appoint counsel and all discussions with the defendant outside of the presence of
counsel shall cease."); see also § 16-7-301(4)(b) ("[I]f counsel is retained by the defendant, or if
counsel is appointed for the defendant, when it appears that the effective administration of justice
will thereby be served, the prosecutor may engage in additional plea discussions with the counsel for
the defense for the purpose of reaching a plea agreement.").
108. See § 16-7-301(4)(a) (requiring advisements in the context of the pre-counsel pleas);
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (requiring general advisements by the court when accepting a guilty plea); §
16-7-207 (2011) (requiring general advisements by the judge at a defendant's initial appearance).
109. COLO. R. CRIM. P. I1; see also People v. Wade, 708 P.2d 1366, 1369-70 (Colo. 1985).
110. COLO. R. CRIM. P. I 1(b); see also COLO. R. CRIM. P. 5(c)(2).
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B. An Example of Common County Court Practice: The City and County
of Denver
In order to place the Colorado rules for misdemeanor plea negotia-
tion in context, it is useful to consider the actual day-to-day practice in
Colorado's most populated county: Denver.
In all of the county courts of Denver, the plea process begins with
the defendant viewing a standardized set of recorded warnings."' All
defendants, whether in or out of custody, are required to either watch a
video advisement, listen to an audio advisement, or read a written ad-
visement of their rights before speaking to the district attorney. The ad-
visement, contained in the appendix, explains to the accused the proce-
dures of the forthcoming initial appearance and provides an overview of
the individual constitutional and statutory rights, including the right to
counsel, to which each defendant is entitled. Other rights described in the
advisement include the right to bail, the right to a jury trial, the right to a
speedy trial, and the right to remain silent.
After receiving the standard advisement, and before the initial ap-
pearance, a district attorney speaks directly with each defendant in the
manner required by CRS § 16-7-301. That is, the prosecutor meets with
the defendant and, after reiterating that the defendant has a right to coun-
sel if he does not wish to plead guilty, "tell[s] the defendant any [plea]
offer that can be made based on the facts as known by the prosecuting
attorney at that time." 1 2 This communication of a plea offer occurs be-
fore the initial appearance, but only moments before: the plea offer is
generally communicated to the defendant in the courtroom in the mo-
ments immediately prior the initial appearance and arraignment on the
complaint.
If the defendant agrees to the prosecution's pre-counsel plea offer,
then the defendant is given a written Rule 11 advisement form. One side
of the form sets out the proposed disposition that will be presented to the
court and contains the enumerated constitutional and statutory rights the
defendant waives by pleading guilty. The other side of the form includes
the statutory language describing the crime to which the defendant is
pleading guilty and the minimum and maximum penalties the court can
impose. Once the defendant signs the Rule 11 form, the district attorney
informs the court of the proposed disposition, including the agreed upon
penalty, and then tenders the signed form to the court. The judge then
gives an oral advisement of the Rule 11 warnings and makes several
findings on the record: first, that the defendant's plea is entered knowing-
111. This practice has been verified by the authors through discussions with attorneys practic-
ing in the District.
112. § 16-7-301(4)(a).
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ly, voluntarily, and intelligently; and second, that there is a factual basis,
or valid waiver of the establishment of a factual basis, for the plea." 3
In Denver County, then, any defendant who enters a pre-counsel
guilty plea at his arraignment is advised of his right to trial, including,
specifically, the right to counsel, no less than four times: (1) by a video,
audio, or written advisement before speaking with the district attorney;
(2) by the district attorney herself, when a plea is offered; (3) through the
written Rule 11 advisement; and (4) by the court, before a guilty plea is
accepted.
If the district attorney is unable to make a plea offer, or no agree-
ment is reached before the initial appearance, the court will arraign the
defendant on the complaint and proceed with the initial appearance in a
manner similar to a felony prosecution.1 14 Of course, the advantages of
taking an early, pre-counsel plea offer may be substantial for the defend-
ant. A defendant may only be able to obtain immediate release if he ac-
cepts the prosecution's offer; indeed, defendants not released on bail will
not even be appointed counsel until their next court appearance. Moreo-
ver, a defendant who refuses the initial plea, at the very least, risks the
possibility of higher penalties or charges if the initial plea offer is re-
voked or altered." 5
To date, there has only been one direct challenge to Colorado's sys-
tem of requiring misdemeanor defendants to talk with prosecutors about
possible plea options before the appointment of counsel, and the issue
was not resolved on the merits. The civil complaint challenging the sys-
tem was dismissed without prejudice on standing grounds, and only re-
cently has an amended complaint been filed.1 16 Consequently, the legal
113. The absence of a recording or transcript would likely render the waiver of counsel imper-
missible. As a general matter, the knowing and voluntary waiver of rights accompanying a plea must
be directly evidenced in a transcript or recording. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-
43 (1969); see also State v. Combs, No. 07CA009173, 2007 WL 4554241, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
28, 2007) (noting that it is "impossible to determine whether [a defendant] was advised of her right
to counsel and voluntarily waived that right in open court" when there is no record).
114. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-207(1) (2011).
115. Out of custody defendants will be given a new court date to appear before the trial court
judge and provided information on how to apply for a court-appointed public defender if they cannot
afford to retain counsel.
116. Courtroom Minutes, Colorado Criminal Defense Bar v. John W. Suthers, 10-cv-02930-
JLK (July 28, 2011); see also Jessica Fender, Judge Asks for New Complaint in Indigent Defense
Lawsuit, DENVER POST, July 28, 2011, http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_18568810
("[Judge] Kane dismissed the defense attorneys' complaint, giving them 60 days to re-file and possi-
bly to find indigent people who had been harmed by the state law that requires those charged with a
misdemeanor to discuss a plea with prosecutors before receiving counsel."). A second amended
complaint was filed on January 20, 2012. Second Amended Complaint, Colo. Criminal Def. Bar v.
Suthers, No. 10-CV-02930-JLK-BNB (D. Colo. Jan. 20, 2012). Of particular note, one factual alle-
gation in in the amended complaint is that "[i]ndigent defendants whose applications for counsel are
deferred . . . have already appeared before a judicial officer to learn the charges against them and the
potential restrictions on their liberty . .. [and therefore] [t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel has
already attached." Id. at 38-39. To be sure, the timing of these discussions, and whether they occur
pre or post-attachment, could have Constitutional significance. The authors own observations and
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issues surrounding this unique Colorado practice remain largely unde-
veloped and much more the subject of media and public speculation than
precise legal analysis." 7 The following section comprehensively reviews
the viability of Sixth Amendment challenges to each aspect of Colora-
do's misdemeanor plea bargaining system both in anticipation of the
inevitable litigation on these questions, and in furtherance of a more
complete understanding of the limitations of claims arising under the
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel.' 18
III. COLORADO'S SYSTEM UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
MICROSCOPE
There are several features of the Colorado system for prosecuting
misdemeanors that raise important and novel questions of Sixth Amend-
ment law. Colorado provides a valuable test case for understanding the
limitations on the right to counsel in the pretrial context. Previous schol-
arship has tended to focus on pre-attachment interrogation as the most
compelling gap in the right to counsel doctrine's current protections, but
Colorado's pre-counsel plea system presents a scenario that is equally
daunting for the un-counseled defendant. For example, Sixth Amend-
ment scholar Brooks Holland has argued that there is no pretrial context
for which the "advice of counsel matter[s] more than during an interroga-
tion.""'9 But scholars like Holland have not considered procedures like
those in place in Colorado. The danger of an interrogation without coun-
sel has been identified as the risk of pitting an untrained, often nervous
conversations with prosecutors suggest that the vast majority of plea discussions with unrepresented
misdemeanor defendants pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-301(4) occur prior to their first appear-
ance.
117. See P. Solomon Banda, Colorado Lawsuit Challenges State's Public Defender Law,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.legalnews.com/detroit/860667 ("Doug Wilson, Colo-
rado's public defender, estimated it would cost up to $6 million to add 55 attorneys and support staff
to handle an estimated 15,000 to 17,000 additional cases to comply with the Supreme Court deci-
sion."); Felisa Cardona, Suit Argues All Defendants Deserve Counsel from the Start, DENVER POST,
Dec. 9,2010, http://www.denverpost.com/recommended/ci 16812574; Christina Dickinson, Lawsuit
Challenges Colo. Public Defender Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 30, 2011,
http://www.9news.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=178759&catid=222; Jessica Fender, Judge
Asks for New Complaint in Indigent Defense Lawsuit, DENVER POST, July 28, 2011,
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci 18568810.
118. A class of individual defendants who suffered extended pretrial incarceration because of
the delayed appointment of counsel procedures would have standing to challenge the Colorado
procedures. Moreover, the Supreme Court has previously recognized that challenges to pretrial
detention procedures qualify for an exception to the mootness rule such that the issue could be fully
litigated even if the defendants' cases have been concluded. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111
n.1 1 (1975) ("Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any given indi-
vidual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or convict-
ed. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons
similarly situated will be detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, in
short, is one that is distinctly capable of repetition, yet evading review." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
119. Holland, supra note 13, at 384.
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defendant against a skilled prosecutor, which results in the defendant
making decisions that do not protect his interests. 120
Notably, however, at least as much is at stake when a defendant en-
gages in plea bargaining discussions without the assistance of counsel.
There is no portion of a non-capital case that is more important than the
process of formally and officially waiving all rights, including the right
to a jury, the right to counsel, and the right to contest one's guilt, and this
is a process that occurs dozens of times per day, without counsel, across
the state of Colorado. Colorado's rules requiring prosecutors to engage
defendants in plea discussions, while mandating that the appointment of
counsel be "deferred,"'21 presents a series of unresolved questions about
the scope of Sixth Amendment protections in the pretrial context.
A. Plea Bargaining Without Counsel as a Sixth Amendment Violation
If a proceeding is deemed critical whenever the proceeding has the
"inherent potential for prejudice .. . which the presence of counsel can
avert,"' 22 then plea negotiations, perhaps more than any single event,
other than the criminal trial itself, embody the characteristics of a pro-
ceeding that justify requiring the presence of counsel.123 Consistent with
this view, plea bargaining has been recognized as a critical stage of the
criminal process. In Padilla v. Kentucky,124 for example, the Court ob-
served, "the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel." 25 Accordingly, the Colorado rule providing that "the prosecut-
mg attorney is obligated" to make a plea offer to the defendant before the
appointment of counsel 26 raises the specter of a critical stage being rou-
tinely conducted in the absence of counsel.
The timing of the prosecution's plea offer to a pro se defendant is
potentially dispositive as to whether Colorado's statutorily mandated pre-
counsel plea bargaining is merely disconcerting or, instead, unconstitu-
tional. The applicable Colorado rules do not specify when the prosecutor
should negotiate with the defendant, but appear to anticipate that it will
happen, at least on occasion, after the initial appearance. The governing
Colorado statute is notably vague on timing, explaining only that for
120. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 180 n.l (1991) (citing Michigan v. Jackson,
475 U.S. 625, 633-34 (1986)).
121. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301(4)(a) (2011).
122. Megan E. Bums, Note, The Presentence Interview and the Right to Counsel: A Critical
Stage Under the Federal Sentencing Structure, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 571 (1993) (citing
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967)).
123. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (stating that plea bargaining "is not
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system" (quoting Robert E.
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
124. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
125. Id. at 1486.
126. § 16-7-301(4)(a).
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misdemeanor prosecutions, the "prosecuting attorney is obligated" to
make a plea offer to the defendant based on the facts known to the prose-
cution "at that time" and explaining that the application for defense
counsel must "be deferred until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken
with the defendant" regarding the plea offer. 127 Colorado Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 5, by contrast, specifically anticipates that some pre-
counsel plea discussions will occur after the initial appearance. 12 8 Rule 5
provides:
At the first appearance in the county court the defendant shall be
advised in accordance with the provisions set forth in subparagraphs
(a)(2)(I) through (VII) of this Rule, except that the defendant shall be
advised that an application for the appointment of counsel shall not
be made until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the de-
fendant as provided in C.R.S. 16-7-301(4)(a).12 9
In other words, the Colorado rule explaining the procedures for an
initial appearance specifically provide that a defendant must be advised
of his right to counsel, but with the caveat that this right does not apply
until after the statutorily required pre-counsel plea discussions have oc-
curred. If the rule anticipates the need for this proviso at the time of the
initial appearance, then it must also anticipate that at least in some cir-
cumstances the required plea discussions will occur after the initial ap-
pearance. To this extent, Colorado's procedures for pre-counsel plea
negotiations present a clear Sixth Amendment violation. Where an offer
and discussion of a plea occurs after the initial appearance has com-
menced, and without the presence of defense counsel, the right to coun-
sel is violated-the right has attached and the plea discussion is a critical
stage. This is a straightforward Sixth Amendment violation.
In many counties, however, the actual practice does not so clearly
conflict with established federal law on the right to counsel because the
timing of the prosecution's plea offer to a pro se defendant appears to
precede the attachment of the right to counsel.13 0 In Denver County, for
example, these pre-counsel plea negotiations, to the best of the authors'
understanding, always occur before the initial appearance, at which time
the right to counsel has not attached, at least not as a matter of clearly
established federal law.' 3' Moreover, the authors of this Article have
observed or spoken to prosecutors in other counties where the practice of
127. Id
128. See COLO. R. CRIM. P. 5(c)(2).
129. Id.
130. If the Colorado procedures do not violate existing Supreme Court precedent, then a Sixth
Amendment challenge on federal habeas review would likely fail. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) (1996)
(conditioning relief on the state court's deviation from "clearly established Federal law").
131. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008) ("[Tlhe right to counsel attach-
es at the initial appearance before a judicial officer . .. [when] the magistrate informs the defendant
of the charge in the complaint, and of various rights in further proceedings, and determine[s] the
conditions for pretrial release . . . ." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the trial court judge ensures that the defendant is not engaging in post-
initial appearance plea bargaining without the aid of counsel. For exam-
ple, it appears to be a routine practice for many judges, before commenc-
ing an initial appearance, to ask the misdemeanor defendant whether he
has had an opportunity to discuss possible plea offers with the prosecu-
tion. When the defendant states that he has not yet spoken with the pros-
ecution as required by statute, the judge delays the initial appearance and
demands that the prosecution promptly meet with the defendant to dis-
cuss plea options. 3 2 Based on observations by the authors and conversa-
tions with misdemeanor lawyers, the common practice, then, is for these
pre-counsel plea negotiations to occur exclusively pre-initial appearance.
This is not to say that defendants receiving such offers have suffi-
cient bargaining power to offset the extraordinary risks associated with
waiving all of their trial rights just because the criminal proceeding has
not formally commenced.133 But just as government efforts to deliberate-
ly elicit incriminating statements from defendants (perhaps through the
use of informants or recording devices) before attachment have been held
not to violate the Sixth Amendment, the weight of Sixth Amendment
precedent defining the outer temporal reaches of the right to counsel pre-
trial supports the view that defendants who engage in plea negotiations
prior to "the first appearance before a judicial officer" 34 are not covered
by the right to counsel.'35
Of course, not all commentators have recognized the implications of
the attachment issue in this context. For example, shortly after the
Rothgery decision was handed down in 2008, a note in the Harvard Law
Review concluded that in Colorado "Rothgery will significantly alter the
current practice: misdemeanor defendants' right to counsel will no longer
be conditioned on the defendant first speaking directly with the prosecu-
tor to discuss a potential plea."l36 This conclusion, however, appears to
132. The Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure require that an "arrested person shall be taken
without unnecessary delay before the nearest available county court." COLO R. CRIM. P. 5(c). The
routine aspects of booking a newly arrested defendant do not constitute an unnecessary delay. How-
ever, delay designed to further investigative goals is likely to violate Rule 5. Cf Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (recognizing that as a matter of federal law confessions obtained be-
cause of a failure to present the defendant without unnecessary delay are excluded). Delays to obtain
prosecutorial advantage in a plea negotiation are no more defensible than delays designed to elicit a
confession and should be regarded as unnecessary for purposes of Rule 5.
133. As one commentator has noted, Colorado's approach creates "troubling incentive struc-
ture . . . clearly constructed to encourage waiver of the right to counsel .. . [because a] defendant
who has already accepted such a bargain and stands before the judge ready to enter the plea is un-
likely to suddenly assert his newfound right to counsel." Roberts, supra note 5, at 367.
134. Id. at 194.
135. Scholars have urged an abandonment of the rigid attachment inquiry in favor of a fact
specific inquiry that would assess the importance of counsel in a given context. Under this standard,
whether adopted as a matter of federal or state law, the plea bargaining without counsel that occurs
in Colorado would likely run afoul of the right to counsel. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 16, at 1671,
1668 n.200.
136. Note, Sixth Amendment-Attachment of the Right to Counsel, 122 HARV. L. REV. 306,
312 (2008).
2012] 349
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WRE VIEW
assume that the plea negotiations required by statute in Colorado do not
occur until after the first appearance. In any county where the prosecu-
tor's duty to discuss potential plea offers with defendants is carried out
before the initial appearance, the note's conclusion that the Colorado
system is inconsistent with the existing Sixth Amendment strictures is far
from clear.
Stated more directly, although the denial of counsel resulting in a
guilty plea is generally grounds for relief under the Sixth Amendment,
there is no ground for relief before the formal attachment of the right. 3 1
Thus, an unwise guilty plea may not have a remedy in the right to coun-
sel if the harm occurs before attachment. By the same token, a defendant
who is offered and rejects an extremely favorable plea deal and realizes
after counsel is appointed that refusing the plea was a serious mistake,
will not be able to seek relief under the Sixth Amendment despite the
recent Frye and Lafler decisions. That is to say, neither the defendant
who unwisely pleads guilty, nor the defendant who unwisely refuses to
plead guilty, has an established claim under the Sixth Amendment.138
Only if the prosecutor waits to offer a plea deal until after the initial ap-
pearance, or if the prosecutor engages in further plea discussions with the
defendant after the initial appearance and before counsel is appointed, is
the path to Sixth Amendment relief well established.13 9
Consequently, in order to demonstrate a right to counsel injury for
State acts before an initial appearance, a court would need to adopt a
broader conception of attachment in this context. There are at least two
conceivable bases for arguing that attachment occurs before the initial
appearance under Colorado's misdemeanor prosecution procedures.
First, plea negotiations before the initial appearance could trigger the
right to counsel under a manifestly broad reading of Rothgery. On such a
reading, the video or audio warnings that defendants receive before the
pre-counsel plea discussions would constitute the point of attachment. In
support of this view is the fact that that once a defendant is required to
watch a video advising him of his rights and the limitations on his liber-
ties, he almost certainly understands his situation as one in which the
"adverse positions of the government and defendant have solidified."'1
4 0
137. Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985) (recognizing the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel at time of a guilty plea).
138. Even in the context of felony an unwise or uncounseled not guilty plea may violate the
Sixth Amendment under recently decided decisions. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399
(2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). However, the protections extending to a not guilty
plea are, to be sure, no broader in scope than the protections for a guilty plea. Accordingly, if the
right has not attached, it cannot be violated.
139. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (noting that the Court has
"long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel"); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201, 204-415 (1964) (recognizing that a post-attachment critical stage-including mere interroga-
tion-requires the appointment of counsel).
140. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
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It is no answer that the prosecutor herself is not yet aware that the de-
fendant was arrested or charged, for the right to counsel attaches even in
the absence of assent by the prosecutor.141 On the other hand, the point of
attachment has traditionally been linked to formal charges or a "prelimi-
nary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 4 2 A video played
on a courtroom or jailhouse monitor without the presence of counsel, a
judge, or any other judicial officers has little in common with a judicial
proceeding. Although Rothgery embraces a more functionalist assess-
ment of what constitutes the point of attachment for the right to counsel
by liberating attachment from the requirement of a formal charge, the
mere playback of a pre-recorded video is a far cry from an in-court ap-
pearance by the defendant. It may therefore be difficult to fairly conceive
of viewing the video as the point at which the "government has commit-
ted itself to prosecute." 43
A second, stronger argument for attachment before the initial ap-
pearance is that the prosecution's offer of a plea deal is itself the point of
attachment. To the extent that Rothgery reflects a movement toward a
functional analysis of pretrial Sixth Amendment rights,'" there may be
room to argue that efforts to negotiate with a defendant, particularly
when those negotiations happen in the courtroom just moments before
the initial appearance, are themselves sufficiently indicative of a "com-
mit[ment] . . . to prosecute" 4 5 as to give rise to Sixth Amendment at-
tachment. After all, the attachment inquiry is, as the Court explained in
Kirby v. Illinois,14 6 whether "the adverse positions of government and
defendant have solidified" such that a "defendant finds himself faced
with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the
intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."l 4 7 Certainly some
misdemeanor plea offers present complexities and intricacies no less
compelling than the initial appearance itself. Indeed, the initial appear-
ance is a rather pro forma event if the defendant has already taken stock
of the "substantive and procedural" law and made the decision to plead
guilty.14 8 The negotiation of a plea offer suggests a level of formality and
finality far higher than when the police focus investigative energies in
the direction of a defendant by interrogating him, or plant an informant
141. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 194-95 (2008).
142. Id. at 198.
143. Id. (citing Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689).
144. The Rothgery Court reiterated the holding in Kirby, emphasizing that the attachment
inquiry is not to be understood as one of "mere formalism." Id. at 198 (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at
689). The Court also stated "the constitutional significance ofjudicial proceedings cannot be allowed
to founder on the vagaries of state criminal law, lest the attachment rule be rendered utterly 'vague
and unpredictable."' Id. at 199 n.9 (quoting Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008)).
145. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
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in his presence, such that the right to counsel might fairly be understood
to have attached. 149
In short, although the process of negotiating a plea is among the
most critical stages of a criminal case, if such bargaining occurs before
attachment, the Sixth Amendment is entirely inapplicable. To date, the
Supreme Court has extended the point of attachment back only as far as
the defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer. However, the
attachment of the right to counsel appears to be evolving in a functional-
ist matter, such that even initial appearances conducted without the con-
sent or knowledge of the prosecution trigger the attachment of the Sixth
Amendment. Attachment has become a proxy for the beginning of a
criminal prosecution in whatever form it may take. Consequently, at least
in circumstances such as those presented by a Colorado misdemeanor
prosecution, either the video playback or the actual plea offer and discus-
sion may suffice to trigger attachment.150 Notably, however, applying the
right to counsel to pre-initial appearance events would represent a break
from current Sixth Amendment attachment doctrine.
B. The Plea Colloquy and Entry ofa Plea Without Counsel as a Sixth
Amendment Violation
Assuming that the plea negotiations with unrepresented misde-
meanor defendants required by Colorado law do not violate the Sixth
Amendment, it is necessary to consider whether the plea colloquy con-
149. Scholars like Professor Metzger have proposed doctrinal revisions to the attachment rule
that would also encompass pre-counsel plea negotiations like those that occur in Colorado. Metzger,
supra note 16, at 1689 ("That challenge is best met by evaluating right-to-counsel questions with
reference to factual indicia that demonstrate the need for counsel. These indicia can be culled from
the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment cases and can be deemed the hallmarks of a case that re-
quires the 'guiding hand of counsel' to insure a fair process. The indicia a court should consider are:
(1) adversariness-in-fact between the individual and the prosecution ('adversariness-in-fact'); (2)
complexity in the procedural stage in question ('complexity'); and (3) potential prejudice to the
individual, which prejudice can be countered by providing counsel ('prejudice/benefit').").
150. The issue of pre-initial appearance plea negotiations arises primarily in misdemeanor
cases because only a misdemeanor defendant can plead guilty at an initial appearance. Persons
accused of felonies are entitled to either an indictment or preliminary hearing, and thus the assem-
bly-line plea process cannot be so easily front-loaded. Notably, however, one scholar has identified
the problem of pre-charge plea bargaining in the context of felony cases where a defendant bargains
for a particular sentence and then waives his right to indictment. See Metzger, supra note 16, at 1665
("Federal pre-charge bargaining is an entirely extra-judicial and unregulated process. Some pre-
charge bargaining occurs between prosecutors and unrepresented defendants because the execution
of a search warrant or the 'word on the street' suggests to the defendant that law enforcement wants
to talk to him. In white-collar cases, some pre-charge bargaining is initiated by attorneys."). Indeed,
there are instances of gross incompetence on the part of defense counsel that have greatly increased a
defendant's charges or sentences but for which there is no remedy because the errors of counsel
occurred pre-attachment. Id. at 1668 (noting that the "rigid critical stage doctrine means that there is
a blanket rule than no right to counsel inheres in these [plea] proceedings no matter how concretely
adversary they really are" and using United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 611 (6th Cir. 2000) to
illustrate). Professor Metzger's conclusions, if correct, could be a death knell to arguments that the
plea negotiations in Colorado are themselves a critical stage; however, Metzer's article predates the
more functionalist approach to defining adversary proceedings that was ushered in by the Rothgery
decision.
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ducted in the absence of counsel at the initial appearance is inconsistent
with the right to counsel. The right to counsel attaches no later than the
time when the initial appearance commences; thus, if the plea colloquy is
a critical stage, then conducting the proceeding without counsel seems to
constitute a Sixth Amendment violation.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court emphasized that the "negotiation
of the plea bargain" was the relevant critical stage,"' and that it was the
failure of counsel to properly advise the client and "give correct advice"
during this stage that raised Sixth Amendment concerns.' 52 However, the
only question presented in Padilla was whether counsel's failure to cor-
rectly advise at the plea bargaining stage violated the Sixth Amend-
ment.'53 Where the Court has considered the entry of a plea itself (or the
colloquy), it has suggested that this is a freestanding critical stage. The
leading case is Iowa v. Tovar,154 in which the Court observed, "[t]he en-
try of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks
as a 'critical stage' at which the right to counsel adheres."' 5 5 Likewise,
in another context the Colorado Supreme Court has concluded that all
proceedings relating to plea bargaining-in fact, "the entire plea bargain-
ing process"'-are critical stages.156 Clearly, then, Colorado's initial ap-
pearance is a critical stage of proceedings, at least when it involves a plea
colloquy.
However, the fact that the initial appearance is a critical stage oc-
curring post-attachment does not, without more, mean that the absence of
a lawyer at this proceeding violates the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, the
quoted language from Tovar declaring that the entry of a plea is a critical
stage is mere dicta. The Court's ultimate holding is that heightened warn-
ings regarding the dangers of proceeding without counsel are not re-
quired when a defendant waives counsel and pleads guilty pro se.' In
essence, while obliquely concluding that the plea colloquy is a critical
stage requiring the presence of counsel, the Court in Tovar directly ap-
proved not only un-counseled guilty pleas, but also un-counseled guilty
pleas with limited elaborations as to the risks of waiving the right to an
attorney. Emphasizing that the Constitution "does not force a lawyer
151. 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
152. Id. at 1483.
153. Id. at 1478.
154. 541 U.S. 77 (2004).
155. Id. at 81 (emphasis added) (citing White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963)).
156. Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d 800, 805 (Colo. 2009).
157. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 87-89.
158. Id. at 87-90. As to the plea in question, the Court summarized the facts as follows: "Some
hours after his arrest, Tovar appeared before a judge in the Iowa District Court for Story County.
The judge indicated on the initial appearance form that Tovar appeared without counsel and waived
application for court-appointed counsel. The judge also marked on the form's checklist that Tovar
was 'informed of the charge and his . . . rights and receive[d] a copy of the Complaint."' Id. at 82
(citation omitted).
2012] 353
354 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:2
upon a defendant,"" 9 the Court explained that a waiver of the right to
counsel before a plea entry and colloquy does not require the full force of
warnings that are required under Faretta v. California160 when a defend-
ant wishes to waive counsel and proceed to trial pro se.161 The warnings
required to waive counsel for trial are, according to the Tovar reasoning,
more extensive than the warnings required to waive counsel and to plead
guilty pro se.16 2 In the guilty plea context, even if the defendant "lacked a
full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from
his waiver, it does not defeat the State's showing that the information it
provided to him satisfied the constitutional minimum."' 6 3
Read broadly, then, Tovar threatens to have serious import for ana-
lyzing the constitutionality of the Colorado misdemeanor plea process.
In Tovar, a unanimous Supreme Court concluded that truly "minim[al]
admonishments" suffice to render a pro se plea a valid waiver of the right
to counsel.'65 Tovar held that the Constitution does not require the trial
court to advise the defendant who is considering a pro se guilty plea of
the advantages that defense counsel might offer in such circumstances.16 6
Indeed, the unanimous Court emphasized that the standard advisements
during a plea colloquy-the right to counsel, the nature of the charges,
the other rights waived by a guilty plea, and the range of punishment that
the defendant could face-are sufficient to render a plea knowing and
voluntary, even where the defendant is pro se.167 Accordingly, although
the plea colloquy and entry of the plea is considered a critical stage, the
absence of counsel does not automatically, or even presumptively, give
159. Id. at 87-88.
160. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (holding that a defendant "should be made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that he knows what he is
doing and his choice is made with eyes open" (internal quotations omitted)).
161. See Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1121 (2011) (con-
trasting the warnings required for a defendant to proceed pro se at trial and the warnings required by
Tovar to plead guilty pro se). "Before pro se defendants plead guilty, courts do not even have to ask
whether they are aware that consulting with an attorney might be a good idea." Id. Notably, the
Court has recognized a similar divergence in the protections of pro se defendants in the context of
competence to proceed to trial pro se and competence to plead guilty. A higher standard of compe-
tence is required for a defendant to proceed pro se at trial, Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177-79
(2009), than is required for a defendant to plead guilty, Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-01
(1993).
162. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88-89.
163. Id. at 92 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)) (noting that on a
collateral attack it is the defendant's burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently
waive his right to the assistance of counsel).
164. For a thoughtful and thorough critique of Tovar, see Hughes, supra note 161, at 1114-15
("Tovar provides an example of the Court falling prey to a binary vision of innocence because it
shows the Court prioritizing actual innocence above safeguarding constitutional protections.").
165. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 91-92; see also Hughes, supra note 161, at 1092.
166. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 91-92. As Professor Hughes points out, Tovar "does not require a trial
court to inform a pro se defendant that an attorney may provide an independent opinion of whether it
is wise to plead guilty," nor does it require the trial court to "tell a defendant that without an attorney
the defendant risks overlooking a defense." Hughes, supra note 161, at 1115.
167. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 90-93.
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rise to a constitutional injury.16 8 Stated more directly, if a defendant vol-
untarily and knowingly waives his right to counsel, even in the absence
of any heightened warnings about the risks of pro se plea agreements, the
prospect of a successful Sixth Amendment claim is in serious doubt.169
On the other hand, Tovar could perhaps be limited to its facts such
that in some prosecutions, even misdemeanor prosecutions, the pre-plea
waiver of counsel would be understood to require more robust warnings
to the defendant than are required at a normal plea hearing. Tovar was
characterized by the Court as a routine drunk driving plea based on evi-
dence of intoxication. 1o Significantly, the Court noted that Tovar never
"articulate[d] ... the additional information counsel could have provid-
ed, given the simplicity of the charge." 171 Perhaps in a more complicated
case, a case where the prosecution's evidence was not dispositive of guilt
(unlike the breathalyzer in Tovar), the Court would be willing to
acknowledge the critical role that defense counsel plays at the plea collo-
quy.
The Tovar decision suggested that the expansiveness of the plea
warnings may vary depending on the context such that more thorough
168. Arguably, the most damaging misstep that the defendant could make during a plea collo-
quy would be to make admissions as to new, not yet charged crimes and thus facilitate additional
criminal proceedings against himself. However, any error or omission by counsel in this regard may
be outside of the constitutional scope of the right to counsel insofar as the right to counsel is offense
specific-that is to say, errors of defense counsel contributing to the prosecution of an uncharged
crime, while lamentable and perhaps ethically unsound, do not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment as
currently interpreted. See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-68, 174 (2001).
169. In a felony, even the indictment can be waived (except in capital cases). FEDERAL
PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 22:725 (2011), available at Westlaw FEDPROC. Accordingly, if
Colorado's system of misdemeanor prosecutions is regarded as constitutional, it is possible that such
pre-plea, assembly-line style proceedings could become more prevalent in felony cases. As with a
misdemeanor, meeting with the defendant prior to the initial appearance might be considered pre-
attachment and outside the purview of the Sixth Amendment, and if the defendant was willing to
waive all of his rights at a judicial proceeding, including the right to counsel and the right to be
charged by an indictment or information, it is theoretically possible that persons charged with felo-
nies could appear without counsel and plead guilty during their initial appearance, all without the
appointment of counsel. There are practical and statutory reasons why this result seems unlikely in
the near future.
170. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 82, 92-93.
171. Id at 93. In Tovar, the Court specifically noted that the waiver of counsel was adequate in
view of the "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this] case." Id. at 93 (quoting John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). As a practical matter, however, it seems that federal courts
agree that a defendant is entitled to waive his right to counsel at a plea hearing, without particularly
onerous warnings about the related risks from the trial court. See, e.g., Georgetown Law Journal
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, Guilty Pleas, 39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 414, 449
n.1326 (2010) (compiling circuit court opinions applying Tovar). Particularly interesting is King v.
Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 492-94 (6th Cir. 2006), which upheld a trial court's determination that the
defendant had waived counsel prior to pleading guilty to several theft related offenses even though
the defendant himself had never explicitly waived counsel. ("The facts of this case are atypical of
most waiver-of-counsel cases because King did not straightforwardly assert his right to self-
representation, and even told the trial court twice that he did not wish to represent himself. Nonethe-
less, by rejecting all of his options except self-representation, King necessarily chose self-
representation."); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. I 1(b)(1)(D) (refusing to require any detailed enunciation
of the costs associated with waiving counsel).
2012]1 355
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
warnings could be required in more complicated cases.1 72 Indeed, the
Court's reasoning in Tovar is grounded in the actual-innocence-centric
notion that the danger of appointing counsel is that "the defendant [may]
delay[] his plea in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a tenable
basis for contesting or reducing the criminal charge," thus causing the
"prompt disposition of the case" to be impeded. 173 Arguably, then, where
the crime at issue is more complicated and the facts more disputed, the
appointment of counsel would not have the same sort of attenuated con-
nection to innocence that undergirds the reasoning of Tovar-that is to
say, efforts to establish innocence may not be in "vain" when the crime
charged is more complicated and the facts more contestable. 174
Moreover, there are some potentially significant procedural distinc-
tions between the misdemeanor plea process in Colorado and the pro-
ceedings in Tovar. These differences suggest that the waivers given dur-
ing the Colorado plea colloquy are not sufficient to avoid concerns re-
garding the right to counsel. In Tovar, the defendant waived his right to
counsel at an initial appearance and then subsequently appeared at an
arraignment without counsel.17 5 At the second appearance, Tovar con-
firmed that he did not wish to have counsel appointed, rejected an offer
of an attorney by the court, and pled guilty.176 Tovar, then, presents a
scenario in which the defendant expressed his desire to proceed without
the assistance of counsel before a judicial officer on multiple occasions.
By contrast, in Colorado, a misdemeanor defendant waives counsel only
once before a judicial officer and does so at the same time that he pleads
guilty. The formal waiver of counsel under the Colorado procedures is
significantly more compressed and expedited, and these slight differ-
ences may prove constitutionally significant.17 7 In justifying its holding
172. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 92-93.
173. Id. at 93; see also Hughes, supra note 161, at 1117-20 (quoting this same language in
support of the critique that Tovar is overly focused on factual innocence to the detriment of legal, or
"unmodified" innocence).
174. At least one commentator has noted that, to date, "state courts-which also have an inter-
est in judicial expediency-have almost invariably followed Tovar rather than interpreting their own
state constitutions." Hughes, supra note 161, at 1118. However, some states appear to provide for
greater protections than those required in Tovar, such as requiring that the waiver of counsel be in
writing. See State v. Combs, No. 07CA009173, 2007 WL 4554241, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28,
2007) ("In petty offense cases, involving a penalty of no more than six months incarceration, all
waivers of counsel must be made on the record in open court. In serious offense cases, involving
penalties including more than six months of incarceration, any waiver of counsel must be made both
on the record in open court and in writing filed with the court." (citations omitted)). There are a
variety of misdemeanor offenses in Colorado that present issues that are far more complicated than
the questions of proof raised in an intoxication case. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111 (2011)
(harassment); § 18-6-803.5 (violation of protection order); § 18-4-401 (theft); § 18-4-501 (criminal
mischief); § 18-3-206 (menacing).
175. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 82.
176. Id.
177. It should be noted that persons facing misdemeanor charges in Colorado are effectively
advised of their right to counsel four times: once by video, once by the prosecutor, once on the Rule
11 form, and once on the record during the colloquy. Only one of these waivers is on the record and
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in Tovar, the Court specifically described the multiple levels of waiver
that were given and noted that this was not a situation in which the guilty
plea alone was deemed sufficient to waive all counsel rights:
[W]e need not endorse the State's position that nothing more than the
plea colloquy was needed to safeguard Tovar's right to counsel. Pre-
liminarily, we note that there were some things more in this case. To-
var first indicated that he waived counsel at his initial appearance, af-
firmed that he wanted to represent himself at the plea hearing, and
declined the court's offer of "time to hire an attorney" at sentencing,
when it was still open to him to request withdrawal of his plea .... 178
Consequently, the Colorado procedures for misdemeanor pleas dur-
ing the initial appearance raise an issue not decided in Tovar. Rather than
three distinct on-the record waivers of counsel, a Coloradan facing mis-
demeanor charges who wishes to take advantage of the pre-initial ap-
pearance plea offer is effectively given "nothing more than the plea col-
loquy" 79 in terms of a judicially supervised waiver of the right to coun-
sel. This appears to be the precise position that the Tovar Court refused
to endorse.
Furthermore, Colorado's one-shot approach to waiving counsel per-
haps implicates Sixth Amendment concerns unique from those decided
in Tovar. A strong argument can be made that the spirit and purpose of
the Sixth Amendment support a narrow reading of Tovar such that, when
the procedures vary from those approved in Tovar, the waiver of counsel
before a guilty plea requires warnings similar to those required under
Farretta. The fact that Tovar had at least three distinct opportunities to
assert his right to counsel before a judge certainly seems materially dis-
tinguishable from the one-shot plea colloquy waivers that occur in Colo-
rado misdemeanor cases. And arguably, in cases where the charges
against the defendant are more contestable because of a lack of definitive
proof of guilt, such as a breathalyzer exam, the waiver of counsel re-
quires more thorough and detailed warnings than those approved in To-
var.
In sum there are reasoned bases for concluding that Tovar does not
compel the conclusion that Colorado's procedures are constitutionally
sound. Presently, however, the best that can be said for defendants in this
context is that the law regarding the requirement for waiver of counsel
before a plea in a case more complicated than, or procedurally distin-
guishable from Tovar, remains unclear and undeveloped.
before a neutral judge. Nonetheless, like the circumstances in Tovar, there are multiple opportunities
for a defendant to invoke the right to counsel.
178. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 90-91 (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 90 (discussing Iowa law).
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C. Even if Colorado's System Otherwise Violates the Sixth Amendment,
Does the Absence ofAny Actual Incarceration Render a Conviction
Constitutional?
Even if Colorado's procedures for pre-counsel plea bargaining oth-
erwise violate the right to counsel, the absence of a sentence of actual
incarceration would render the misdemeanor convictions constitutional.
That is to say, regardless of whether the plea bargaining before the initial
appearance is a critical stage, and regardless of whether the waiver of
counsel during the plea colloquy is inadequate, if the defendant is not
sentenced to a term of incarceration, the Sixth Amendment is not impli-
cated.180 Actual incarceration is a necessary prerequisite of a Sixth
Amendment violation.' 8 1
There are three possible ways in which the actual incarceration rule
could apply to misdemeanor plea bargains in Colorado. First, if the sys-
tem otherwise violates the right to counsel and the defendant is sentenced
to a term of jail, even if only a single day, the Sixth Amendment is vio-
lated. Equally obvious, if a defendant is sentenced to no incarceration,
then the misdemeanor plea in that case did not violate the Sixth Amend-
ment, no matter how inadequate the waiver of counsel. The situation is
less tidy than this binary description suggests, however, because ques-
tions are raised by sentences of probation, time-served, and in-home de-
tention.
In Alabama v. Shelton,18 2 the Court held that the right to counsel is
violated when a defendant is denied counsel and sentenced to a suspend-
ed sentence without the assistance of counsel.183 The majority reasoned
that "[a] suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of
conviction" because "[o]nce the prison term is triggered, the defendant is
incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying of-
fense, [and thus] [t]he uncounseled conviction . . . results in imprison-
ment."' 84 In other words, even though the defendant is only subjected to
incarceration if he violates the terms of probation, because the suspended
sentence results in punishment for the prior un-counseled conviction, and
not for the probation violation, the Sixth Amendment is violated. 85
Shelton's clear rule that the right to counsel applies to suspended
sentences for incarceration does not, however, necessarily apply to un-
180. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1979).
181. Id.
182. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
183. Id. at 662.
184. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Id; see also id. at 667 ("Deprived of counsel when tried, convicted, and sentenced, and
unable to challenge the original judgment at a subsequent probation revocation hearing, a defendant
in Shelton's circumstances faces incarceration on a conviction that has never been subjected to 'the
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing."' (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656
(1984))).
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counseled convictions resulting in a straight probation sentence. In the
case of a suspended sentence, the defendant is actually sentenced to in-
carceration-with the sentence only activated by a subsequent probation
violation. In contrast, a defendant subjected to probation is not actually
sentenced to incarceration for the initial offense; instead, the sentence of
incarceration, if any, is punishment for contempt, in the form of the pro-
bation violation.' 8 7 Some courts have held that Shelton therefore does not
apply to straight sentences of probation, since the sentence of incarcera-
tion does not flow from the tainted (un-counseled) original conviction.'88
If the Court ultimately embraces such a formalist reading of Shel-
ton, then it would impose a very minimal limitation on states that utilize
straight probation. In theory, a defendant in Colorado could plead guilty
to straight probation without implicating the right to counsel. That is, so
long as the sentence was straight probation, such that the violation of
probation will result in punishment for contempt alone, as opposed to a
sentence linked to the crime of conviction, the Sixth Amendment would
not impose any limitations on the pre-counsel misdemeanor plea.'89 No-
tably, however, Colorado does not currently provide for sentences of
straight probation.'o Thus, unless the terms of a sentence of probation
are statutorily amended, sentencing a Colorado defendant to probation
implicates the right to counsel.
Finally, and most challenging for purposes of defining the scope of
the Sixth Amendment in this context, are sentences of in-home detention
186. Cf Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789-90 (holding that there is no absolute right to
counsel at a probation revocation hearing); id. at 789 (noting that although "the right of an accused
to counsel in a criminal prosecution" is beyond question, the right to counsel at probation revocation
is "more limited . . . because he has [already] been convicted of a crime" for which the right to
counsel applied).
187. See, e.g., 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 70, § 11.2(a) (discussing circuit court precedent
supporting this conclusion).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Macias, 335 U.S. 421, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Pollard, 389 F.3d 101, 104 (4th Cir. 2004).
189. See, e.g., Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d at 427 ("The Shelton Court expressly refused to address
whether its holding applies to a sentence of probation uncoupled with a suspended sentence.");
Joshua S. Stambaugh, Alabama v. Shelton: One Small Step for Man, One Very Small Step for the
Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 609, 651-52 (2004) (criticizing Shelton's
holding as arbitrary line-drawing, going against the "spirit of Powell and Gideon"); Adam D. Young,
An Analysis of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel As It Applies to Suspended Sentences and
Probation: Do Argersinger and Scott Blow A Flat Note on Gideon's Trumpet?, 107 DICK. L. REV.
699, 713 (2003) ("The concept of liberty in the American criminal justice system far exceeds the
single notion of actual imprisonment."). But see Harvard Law Review, Criminal Law and Proce-
dure, 116 HARV. L. REV. 252, 262 (2002) ("If state legislatures respond to Shelton by creating pro-
bation-only criminal penalties, Shelton may not yield the negative consequences that the dissent and
the amicus foresaw. Rather, courts will merely guarantee that, prior to serving actual jail time, a
criminal defendant will have the benefit of counsel at the proceeding directly responsible for the
incarceration.").
190. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-206(5) (2011) (allowing for any sentence that may have been
originally imposed when a defendant violates probation); see also Robert J. Dieter, Probation-
Sentence Following Revocation, 15 COLO. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 20.48 (2d
ed.) ("If the court revokes the probation, the court may then impose any sentence that the court had
authority to impose at the original sentencing.").
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and sentences of time served for persons charged with misdemeanor of-
fenses. Case law directly on point is scant. The case most directly on
point is an unpublished decision of the Montana Supreme Court, which
reasons that home arrest should be treated the same as imprisonment for
Sixth Amendment purposes insofar as it was "an alternative form of im-
prisonment rather than an alternative to imprisonment."' 9' Other cases,
addressing the issue less directly appear to conflict with this result. For
example, the double jeopardy prohibition on multiple punishments re-
quires that defendants receive credit for all time served in pretrial deten-
tion,192 and this requirement is codified in a federal statute requiring
credit for time served in "official detention" by federal court defend-
ants.193 Applying this statute, the Supreme Court has held that a defend-
ant released on bail but subject to onerous restrictions is not subject to
custody for purposes of the time served credit, 194 and numerous lower
courts have applied this reasoning and explicitly held that in-home deten-
tion is not custodial for purposes of accruing credits for time served. 95
Likewise, for purposes of calculating a defendant's criminal history un-
der the federal sentencing guidelines, circuit courts have held that in-
home detention is not "a sentence of imprisonment."' 96 Of course, these
cases from the federal sentencing context turn solely on questions of
statutory construction and do not preclude the conclusion, reached by the
Montana Supreme Court, that such punishments implicate the Sixth
Amendment. To be sure, sentences of home detention are designed to be
punitive and have an incarcerative quality to them. Nonetheless, the gen-
eral tenor of judicial hostility towards extending the privileges and enti-
tlements associated with incarceration to in-home detentions is, at the
very least, illuminating as to how courts might respond to a claim that a
sentence of in-home detention constitutes actual incarceration for pur-
poses triggering the protections of the right to counsel.
The question of whether a sentence of time served based on time
spent in pretrial detention can satisfy the requirement of actual incarcera-
tion is a similarly unresolved and creates an interesting Sixth Amend-
ment thought experiment. To illustrate the difficulty surrounding this
issue, imagine that a defendant is arrested late on Friday night in Denver
191. The Montana Supreme Court held that a defendant who was given a twenty day sentence
of "home arrest" was actually imprisoned for Sixth Amendment purposes. State v. Morigeau, No.
99-569, 2000 WL 898762, at *2 (Mont. Jul. 6, 2000) ("The State argues that home arrest, which
allows the arrestee considerably more liberty than exists in a prison environment, is not the equiva-
lent of imprisonment.").
192. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2011).
194. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1995) (refusing to consider a release from custody,
no matter how restrictive the conditions, an "official detention" as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion).
195. Georgetown Law Journal Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, Sentencing Guidelines,
39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 699, 769 n.2238 (2010) (compiling cases on this point).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1165 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing United States
v. Phipps, 68 F.3d 159, 162 (7th Cir.1995)).
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for a drunk driving offense or an animal cruelty crime, and that the de-
fendant is held in the city jail until his initial appearance on Monday
morning.19' Imagine further that the prosecutor approaches this defendant
just before the initial appearance and offers him a plea deal of time
served plus community service or some classes if he pleads guilty at the
initial appearance.198 A sentence of community service (or classes) does
not require the appointment of counsel, but the question is whether incar-
ceration that is already complete at the time of the conviction can count
as actual incarceration that triggers the right to counsel. As with the in-
home detention issue, Colorado courts will have a relatively clean slate
insofar as there seems to be only a minimal amount of case law or aca-
demic literature on the relationship between a sentence of time served
and the Argersinger actual incarceration requirement.199
197. Both of these crimes are misdemeanors that carry a potential sentence of incarceration.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1307 (2011) (driving under the influence); § 18-9-202 (cruelty to or ne-
glect of animals). Some class one misdemeanors can carry jail sentences of up to two years. E.g.,
People v. Young, 859 P.2d 814, 817 (Colo. 1993) ("Class one misdemeanor offenses punishable by a
maximum sentence of two years in the county jail, include such offenses as assault in the third
degree; cruelty to or neglect of animals; jury tampering; criminal simulations; and possession of
contraband in the second degree." (citations omitted)).
198. A first DUI offense carries a sentencing range from a minimum of five days up to a max-
imum of one year in jail, as well as a fine and community service. However, the statute dictates that
both the jail time and fine may be suspended if the defendant agrees to classes and other probation
terms. COLo. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1307(3), (6) (2011). As a practical matter, the probation and drug
and alcohol classes are the most likely sentence for a first offense DUl. Notably, some other offens-
es, such as third-degree assault, also carry the risk of substantial jail time; however, the Colorado
Victim's Rights Statute, § 24-4.1-302.5(l)(e), requires the prosecution to consult with the victim
prior to the "disposition of the case." Paradoxically, the victim's rights statute has the effect of
providing misdemeanor defendants increased access to counsel insofar as the pre-counsel pleas
occurring at initial appearances appear to be impermissible under the plain terms of the victim's
rights statute.
199. The majority of courts that have considered the issue have held that sentences of "time
served" do not constitute "actual imprisonment" for Sixth Amendment right to counsel purposes.
See, e.g., Glaze v. Warden Ridgeland Corr. Inst., 481 F. Supp. 2d 505, 510 (D.S.C. 2007) (noting
that although defendant "spent ten days in jail ... he did so because he . . could not post bail" and
explaining that there is not any "[clearly] established federal law supporting his claim that a 'time-
served' sentence constitutes an imposition of a term of imprisonment such that it may not be im-
posed absent the benefit of counsel"); State v. Brown, 995 So. 2d 1034, 1037-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008) ("We reject the defendant's argument that by awarding him forty-eight hours of credit for the
time he spent in jail after his arrest and before entering his plea, the trial court necessarily imposed a
term of imprisonment on his conviction."); id. (distinguishing between jail time that was a result of
arrest, and jail time that was a result of one's conviction); McLaurin v. State, 882 So. 2d 268, 272
(Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (holding there was no Sixth Amendment violation where defendant "received
no further jail time after having pled guilty . . . and [p]retrial incarceration is of no consequence"),
Nicholson v. State, 761 So. 2d 924, 931 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (holding where defendant's sentence
included "48 hrs. in jail Time Served" court concluded that because defendant "did not received any
further prison or jail time" his "prior misdemeanor DUI did not result in a sentence of imprison-
ment").
However, a number of courts, including the Sixth Circuit (in an unpublished decision)
have come to the opposite conclusion. United States v. Cook, 36 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
that defendant's uncounseled conviction "for which he received one day (time served) . . . was not
valid under Scott and Nichols for purposes of sentence enhancement"); State v. O'Neill, 746 N.E.2d
654, 659 (2000) ("We thus hold that where an indigent misdemeanor defendant is not advised of his
right to or provided with counsel, the court may not sentence that defendant to incarceration. This is
true even if the defendant need not report to jail due to the credit he is given for time served."); see
also Roosevelt City v. Curry, 143 P.3d 309, 313 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing in dicta the
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This clean slate allows for several possible approaches. On the one
hand, a literal application of Argersinger suggests that if a defendant is
sentenced to time served, then a conviction obtained without either the
presence of counsel, or a valid waiver of counsel, would violate the Sixth
Amendment. A defendant in such circumstances would be sentenced to a
jail term, his criminal record would reflect this sentence of incarceration,
and any future sentences would potentially be aggravated by the defend-
ant's record of actual incarceration. As such, the right to counsel seems
to have natural application.
On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that a sentence of
time served does not implicate the right counsel. In misdemeanor cases
for which a sentence of time served is imposed, the amount of time
served will always be relatively short, almost always totaling less than a
week.200 More importantly, the "time served" will be exactly the same
whether the prosecutor (1) requests a sentence of time served; (2) merely
seeks a sentence of probation or community service; or (3) dismisses the
charges outright. That is to say, the duration of the actual incarceration is
neither enhanced nor aggravated by the inclusion of time served as part
of the sentence (or as the entire sentence) in the plea deal. Thus, to count
a sentence of time served as a sentence of actual incarceration is to raise
questions about whether a mere fine following a night in jail, or even an
outright dismissal of the case after spending a night in jail, implicates the
right to counsel just as strongly as a six-month jail sentence. Does a plea
bargain that does not specify any incarceration but follows a night of
pretrial detention implicate the right to counsel?201 Considered in this
light, it seems that pre-initial appearance incarceration may not implicate
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but rather, is more profitably con-
2012
sidered as a freestanding constitutional question.
danger of a "trial court routinely imprisoning minor offenders before trial, knowing full well that no
counsel would be appointed and that the ultimate sentence would be probation and time served. Such
a practice would effectively sidestep the requirements of the Sixth Amendment by allowing the
imprisonment of misdemeanor offenders convicted without the benefit of counsel"); id. (encouraging
"trial courts and counsel on both sides of criminal matters to consider the implications of pretrial
confinement in relation to the constitutional rights of defendants").
200. The Fourth Amendment requires that, at the very least, a probable cause determination be
made within 48 hours of all warrantless arrests, unless there is some "extraordinary circumstance."
See, e.g., Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991) ("[A] jurisdiction that pro-
vides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter,
comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein. . . . Where an arrested individual does not
receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours . . . the burden shifts to the government to
demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.").
201. Nicholson v. State, 761 So. 2d 924, 931 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) ("Nicholson would have
this Court find that if a defendant upon initial arrest for DUI spent some time in jail, any guilty plea
thereafter without counsel would be constitutionally unsound.").
202. Unfortunately for defendants, the constitutional propriety of pretrial detention, well be-
yond the brief period of time between an arrest and initial appearance, has been approved by the
United States Supreme Court. The Court has rejected arguments that pretrial detention violates the
presumption of innocence embodied by due process. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747-48
(1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979); see also Shari Lewis, United States v. Saler-
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In sum, even assuming Colorado's system otherwise implicates the
right to counsel, unless a misdemeanor defendant is sentenced to a term
of incarceration, the Sixth Amendment is not violated. There remains
considerable uncertainty, however, as to which misdemeanor sentences
constitute incarceration so as to trigger the right to counsel. Sentences of
time served and even a sentence of home detention potentially fall out-
side the well settled law in this area and provide litigation opportunities
for lawyers seeking to define the outer bounds of the actual incarceration
requirement. Such litigation is essential to efforts to flesh out the con-
tours of the right to counsel more generally, and it is critical to the con-
stitutionality of Colorado's specific misdemeanor plea bargaining rules.
D. Other Issues: Errors by the Prosecution, the Problem of Collateral
Consequences, and Retroactivity
The Colorado procedures for misdemeanor pre-counsel pleas pro-
vide a nearly inexhaustible and intractable set of constitutional questions.
Without attempting to identify every point of constitutional friction un-
der the current misdemeanor plea procedures, a few final issues that are
likely to arise warrant, at the very least, passing attention.
First, there is a range of prosecutorial errors or missteps that could
render an otherwise constitutional procedure impermissible. For exam-
ple, improper threats by the prosecutor during the negotiations without
counsel, such as threatening charges for which there is no good faith
basis to charge, would render the eventual plea involuntary.20 3 Likewise,
if the prosecutor suggests that he is a neutral or detached party who is
able to provide disinterested advice to a defendant, this would run afoul
of ethical obligations and justify a more exacting set of procedures for
waiving counsel.204 Moreover, if the defendant is given incomplete or
no: Destruction of the Presumption of Innocence?, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 573 (1987); Craig Ethan
Allen, Pretrial Detention and the Loss of Innocence, United States v. Salerno, 11 HAMLINE L. REV.
331, 347-48 (1988) ("Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Bell v. Wolfish, which stripped the presumption
of innocence away from pretrial detainees, was a devastating blow to the rights of accused per-
sons."); LeRoy Pernell, The Reign of the Queen of Hearts: The Declining Significance of the Pre-
sumption of Innocence-A Brief Commentary, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 393, 400 (1989) (concluding
that in Salerno the "Supreme Court dealt the death hand to the notion of a pretrial presumption of
innocence"); Harvard Law Review Association, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, 101 HARV. L. REV.
169, 175 (1987) ("The Salerno Court silently reduced the presumption of innocence to nothing more
than an allocation of the burden of proof at trial."). Likewise, the Court has held that pretrial deten-
tion does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 760-
61 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reacting against the assumption in the majority opinion that the
eighth amendment is a limit on the excessiveness of bail but not a substantive right to bail).
203. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) ("Of course, the agents of the
State may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbear-
ing the will of the defendant."); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("In our system,
so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense de-
fined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
204. COLO. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4.3 (2008) (prohibiting a lawyer from pretending to be disin-
terested and barring a lawyer from giving legal advice to an unrepresented party with interests con-
trary to his own client's).
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misleading advisements before speaking with the prosecutor, a failure to
provide the defendant an attorney would implicate the right to counsel in
ways that likely could not be remedied by the standard plea colloquy
provided in Colorado.
In addition, the Colorado procedures for misdemeanor pleas also
raise concerns regarding proper advisements as to collateral consequenc-
es. Under Padilla, defense counsel has an affirmative duty to advise his
client of obvious immigration consequences that flow from a conviction,
whether the conviction is a felony or a misdemeanor.205 As discussed
above, when a defendant is facing felony charges or actual incarceration,
he is entitled to counsel unless he knowingly and voluntarily waives
counsel after proper advisements. A waiver of counsel that is adequate to
waive the benefits of an attorney's advice in deciding whether to plead
guilty would presumably also constitute a waiver of counsel as to advice
regarding the collateral consequences of a guilty plea. That is to say, if a
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the assistance of counsel for
purposes of deciding whether to plead guilty, then the defendant cannot
complain about the absence of reasoned advice as to either the direct or
collateral consequences of his pro se plea. On the other hand, where a
defendant is not entitled to counsel, for example, where the prosecution
agrees at the earliest stage of the case that she will not seek any incarcer-
ation,206 then it is conceivable that both the judge and the prosecutor will
inform the defendant that he does not have a right to appointed counsel.
And there is good reason for such an advisement as it reflects the current
state of Colorado and Sixth Amendment law. However, the Padilla case
may signal a new realm of right to counsel rights that are, as of yet, not
fully formed. Where, for example, a misdemeanor defendant never meets
with counsel, is advised that he does not have a right to counsel, and is
offered a plea of probation or community service that would likely lead
to direct immigration consequences, perhaps there is a right to counsel, 207
or at least specific, detailed warnings from the judge at the time of the
plea colloquy.20 8
205. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). Padilla was convicted of a felony,
transporting a large quantity of marijuana, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Id. at 1477,
206. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-501 (2011).
207. See John D. King, Beyond 'Life and Liberty': The Evolving Right to Counsel, 47 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) ("Although Padilla involved a felony charge ... the deporta-
tion consequences would have been the same if the defendant had been charged with [a misdemean-
or] . . . [and if] the prosecutor had agreed prior to trial not to seek jail time, the defendant would not
have had any federal constitutional right to counsel. Padilla seems to confer a right to the effective
assistance of counsel, then, on a class of defendant who has no right to counsel at all under the Scott
doctrine.")
208. Presently, the Colorado plea advisements-the Rule II form-include a general statement
that a conviction may carry immigration consequences. However, the warning is generic and, appar-
ently, not required by Colorado law. People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 526 (Colo. 1987) ("[A] trial court
is not required to advise a defendant sua sponte of potential federal deportation consequences of a
plea of guilty to a felony charge when accepting such plea."); People v. Nguyen, 80 P.3d 903, 905
364 [Vol. 89:2
THE COLORADO COUNSEL CONUNDRUM
In Padilla, the Court stressed that "[t]he importance of accurate le-
gal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more im-
portant" and emphasized that legal advice regarding immigration conse-
quences is "an integral part-indeed, sometimes the most important part
of' representation for persons who are considering pleading guilty.2 09
The Court's explicit recognition that something other than the trial, and
something other than the criminal consequences, may constitute the most
important aspect of appointed counsel's duties, threatens to fundamental-
ly rework the orientation of the right to counsel.2 0 Whereas the prior
right to counsel cases suggested that the right was fundamentally orient-
ed towards ensuring a full and fair trial, Padilla suggests that certain
ancillary duties of counsel are equally, if not more, important. These
211Iduties are, then, on the brink of being recognized as critical stages.
Accordingly, a defendant who pleads guilty without the assistance of
counsel regarding collateral consequences, and without, at the very least,
thorough warnings from the judge as to potential collateral consequenc-
es, may have a claim under the Sixth Amendment or, more likely, the
Due Process Clause.2 12 To date the Court has only visited the collateral
consequences issue in the context of a felony conviction; however, the
requirement that defendants receive reliable warnings about collateral
consequences that are closely related to the criminal process seems more,
not less, important in the realm of misdemeanor convictions where the
immigration consequences will often be more severe than the actual sen-
213tence sanctioned by statute. Accordingly, although this issue is not
unique to Colorado, in considering the constitutional defects with its
current misdemeanor system, Colorado courts would be wise to address
the relationship between misdemeanor pleas and Padilla.214
(Colo. App. 2003) After Padilla, there is good reason to believe that warnings are required, and the
generic Rule II statements may not be adequate.
209. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
210. Presently there is no scholarship on this question, and this is a gap in the literature that
needs to be filled.
211. But see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (concluding that the purpose of
counsel is simply to facilitate a fair trial).
212. Due process has a longstanding history as a supplementary provider of counsel rights; it
routinely applies to provide counsel-type protections where the Sixth Amendment does not apply.
See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963) (holding that due process requires the
appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant's "first appeal granted as a matter of right"); Evitts
v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (holding that an appeal "is not adjudicated in accord with due
process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney").
213. See King, supra note 207 ("Indeed, in the misdemeanor context, where amount of poten-
tial incarceration is quite low but the collateral consequences significant, the use of incarceration as a
proxy for seriousness is especially crude.")
214. Indeed, if counsel has an obligation to advise a defendant of collateral consequences when
the defendant is facing felony charges and substantial incarceration, then it seems that the im-
portance of advising a defendant of such collateral consequences is of even greater constitutional
concern when the only substantial consequence of the conviction is an immigration or other collat-
eral consequence. On the other hand, the budget constraints are such that Colorado legislatures,
without a directive from the courts, may fail to address this concern. The State of Colorado, through
its Republican Attorney General, joined an amicus brief warning that a decision in favor of Padilla
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Finally, it is worth noting that if Colorado's process for pre-initial
appearance plea bargaining is held unconstitutional under the Sixth
Amendment, it is arguable that this rule will be retroactively applica-
ble.215 Generally, new rules of constitutional law only apply prospective-
ly such that prisoners whose convictions are already final may not bene-
fit from the new rule.2 6 Where, however, the new rule is one of substan-
tive law or a watershed rule of procedure, the constitutional rule is given
retroactive effect.2 17 Although the concept of a watershed rule of proce-
dure defies easy definition, the Supreme Court has repeatedly admon-
ished that those rules worthy of being regarded as watershed rules are
218
generally defined by reference to right to counsel protections. Conse-
quently, new elaborations on the scope of the right to counsel enjoy a
presumption of retroactivity.29 Applying this principle to the present
context, if Gideon and Argersinger compel the conclusion that Colora-
do's misdemeanor procedures are incompatible with the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, then the new rule of procedure ought to apply ret-
roactively.220
"would likely break the back of the plea agreement system." Brief for the States of Louisiana, Ala-
bama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington & Wyoming and the
National District Attorneys Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at *1, Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2564713.
215. In light of the persuasive academic commentary concluding that the Supreme Court is less
likely to expand constitutional rights where the creation of the right will impose extremely large
systemic costs, the potential retroactivity of this rule may be a practical impediment to its legal
development. Cf John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J.
87, 90,98 (1999); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 20-
21 (2002).
216. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
217. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007). Recently the Court observed that "in the
years since Teague, we have rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for
watershed status." Id. at 418.
218. Id. at 419 (recognizing Gideon as "the only case that we have identified as qualifying
under this exception"); see also David E. Johnson, Justice for All: Analyzing Blakely Retroactivity
and Ensuring Just Sentences in Pre-Blakely Convictions, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 875, 945 (2005).
219. Accordingly, in the wake of Alabama v. Shelton's elaboration on Argersiner, lower courts
were quick to recognize the rule's retroactive application. See, e.g., Talley v. State, 640 S.E.2d 878,
882 (S.C. 2007) ("We conclude the new rule announced by Shelton is a watershed rule of criminal
proceeding because the right to counsel undeniably implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy
of the proceeding."); Howard v. United States, 374 F.3d 1068, 1077 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Every exten-
sion of the right to counsel from Gideon through Argersinger has been applied retroactively to
collateral proceedings by the Supreme Court." (citing a compilation of retroactively applied right to
counsel cases)). Likewise, some courts have held that Padilla applies retroactively. See, e.g., Amer
v. United States, No. 1:06CRI 18-GHD, 2011 WL 2160553, at *3 (N.D. Miss. May 31, 2011) ("Both
the language of Padilla and the application of Teague's test indicate that the Padilla [holding]
should apply retroactively."). It seems, however, that most courts have concluded that "Padilla is not
as sweeping and fundamental as that of Gideon, and it does not, therefore, rise to the status of a
watershed rule that must be applied retroactively." People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 899 (N.Y
Crim. Ct. 2010); accordUnited States v. Chang, 2011 WL 3805763, at *1 (10th Cir. 2011).
220. The fact that it is retroactive does not necessarily mean there is a procedure for vindicat-
ing the right. Bars on successive post-conviction petitions may still deprive some prisoners of the
benefit of the new rule.
THE COLORADO COUNSEL CONUNDRUM
CONCLUSION
In Argersiner, the Supreme Court rejected as factually erroneous
claims that the social costs of providing attorneys to persons facing in-
carceration was too high.22' When the Colorado Supreme Court address-
es the question of whether the appointment of counsel is required for all
misdemeanor plea discussions, it will not enjoy this luxury. There is little
doubt that the appointment of counsel for all first appearances in misde-
meanor cases would require an enormous expenditure of resources.
Pragmatic costs aside, however, the pre-counsel plea procedures mandat-
ed by statute in Colorado raise a host of constitutional concerns. The
answers regarding how the right to counsel interacts with the Colorado
procedures is far from certain, but the need for litigation presenting these
questions is long overdue. This Article raises these questions and is in-
tended to serve as the first step in what promises to be a long discussion
about the scope of the right to counsel protections under the Colorado
procedures for misdemeanor plea bargaining. By considering Colorado's
specific procedures, this Article also provides a vehicle for exploring the
surprisingly under-examined and unresolved boundaries of the vital Sixth
Amendment concepts of attachment, critical stage, and incarceration.
221. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972) ("IT]he Nation's legal resources are
sufficient to implement the rule we announce today.").
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